Article

Group Marginalization: Extending Research on Interpersonal Rejection to Small Groups

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Abstract

An extensive research literature has examined the reactions of individuals facing interpersonal rejection. Small groups can also be rejected, but current research tells us little about the experiences of groups and their members directly. We integrate findings from various literatures to gain insight into shared rejection experiences and their outcomes. Of most practical importance, we argue that groups can be expected to react with more hostility than individuals when rejected. Four existing models that account for how group processes might alter such reactions are examined: a need-threat model, a rejection-identification model, a multimotive model, and a dual attitudes model. Aspects of these models are then integrated into a unifying framework that is useful for understanding hostile reactions to group marginalization. Implications for natural groups such as terrorist cells, school cliques, racial and ethnic minorities, and gangs are discussed.

Keywords

group marginalization, rejection, ostracism, aggression involving groups, terrorist cells

In the television documentary "*Columbine: Understanding Why*," the A&E channel followed the Threat Assessment Group task force as they investigated precipitating factors behind Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold's deadly 1999 massacre at their Littleton, Colorado high school (Kurtis, 2007). Amid other factors, the task force emphasized how the two students reinforced one another's hostile attitudes toward peers who had rejected them. Eric had experienced a breakup with his girlfriend, bullying by his classmates, and rejection by the Marines that he wished to join. Likewise, Dylan had faced broad rejection by his classmates. The task force suggested that partially as a result of this shared rejection, the boys became "like a cult of two . . . two guys start talking to each other, reinforce each other's bad ideas, [and] get no realistic challenge to it." The task force further observed, "It's very unlikely that Dylan would have done this without Eric . . . it's unlikely that Eric would have done this without Dylan . . . ."

Certainly, many factors contributed to the actions of Eric and Dylan at Columbine High School. Violent video games, access to weapons, lax school security, and mental illness are just a few variables that have been discussed (Kurtis, 2007). Yet, a major contributor appears to have been the combination of interpersonal rejection and group identification. Through their shared rejection and commiseration, mere frustration with their peers escalated into violence. Hints of this association between group-based rejection and hostility have also been observed in other contexts. After two men at Youngstown State University were asked to leave a fraternity house party in 2011, they returned with guns and opened fire on a group of students—killing 1 and injuring 11 others (Schabner, 2011). The violent actions of many extremist groups are often attributed to their rejection from mainstream society as well (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011; Sageman, 2008). Not all episodes of group-based rejection result in such extreme hostility. One can also imagine members of a school clique spreading malicious gossip about peers who shun them, or a task force that is deprived of funds regularly granted to others sabotaging the goals of the other groups. Group-based rejection can promote hostility in a wide variety of contexts.

We refer to instances of group-based rejection as group marginalization, defined as the intentional rejection of a group by multiple out-group others. Notably, an extensive research literature has examined the affective, cognitive, and behavioral reactions of individuals who are rejected (Blackhart, Nelson, Knowles, & Baumeister, 2009; Smart Richman & Leary, 2009). Group marginalization is different from this individual form of interpersonal rejection because group processes are involved that significantly alter psychological

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processes and outcomes. For instance, research on the interindividual–intergroup discontinuity demonstrates that intergroup interactions tend to be more aggressive (Meier & Hinsz, 2004) and competitive (Wildschut, Pinter, Vevea, Insko, & Schopler, 2003) than interindividual interactions. Research on coalition formation finds that when participants exhibit a proself orientation, they are more likely to form coalitions in intergroup settings than in interindividual settings (van Beest, Andeweg, Koning, & van Lange, 2008). Research on social movement participation illustrates that those who perceive double relative deprivation (personal and collective) are more likely to take collective action than those who perceive personal or collective deprivation alone (Foster & Matheson, 1995). We believe that group marginalization is a distinct phenomenon with unique processes and unique outcomes, and therefore is worthy of independent analysis.

The primary aim of this article is to examine how the research literature addressing interpersonal rejection may be extended to include investigations of small groups. To accomplish this aim, we examine affect, cognitions, and behaviors of those who are targets of rejection, and consider four models that provide insight into how group processes might alter these reactions to rejection. Aspects of these models are then integrated into a unifying framework that is useful for understanding hostile reactions to group marginalization. A secondary aim of this article is to stimulate new research on this topic. Because little research has examined the effects of group marginalization, numerous testable predictions are offered in this article. These predictions are often grounded in theory but occasionally arise from informed speculation when directly relevant research is not available.

Defining Characteristics of Group Marginalization

The study of group marginalization in and of itself is not new. Research on topics such as prejudice and discrimination is extensive (e.g., Dovidio, Glick, & Rudman, 2005). Rather, this article focuses on reactions to marginalization among small, intact groups such as terrorist cells, school cliques, and gangs. To some extent, readers might find that our analysis applies to larger groups as well, but this is not our focus and identical processes and outcomes should not necessarily be expected. We defined group marginalization as the intentional rejection of a group by multiple out-group others. Here, we specify exactly what is meant by this definition.

First and most importantly, a marginalized group is rejected. Rejection is clearly important in its own right, but more practically, it represents a threat to social, psychological, and/or material resources. For instance, it could be said that Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold were denied a sense of social connectedness by fellow students at Columbine High School. Our analysis emphasizes threats toward psychological and social resources such as a sense of social connectedness, but it is presumed that threats toward many material resources may be responded to in a similar fashion. For instance, the desire for equal access to monetary resources among members of a marginalized group is likely influenced by their need for control, a psychological resource. Certainly, people seek out certain basic resources like food, water, and shelter because they fulfill physical needs more so than psychological needs. Yet, many tangible resources are desired because they also fulfill psychological needs (Kruglanski, Chen, Dechesne, Fishman, & Orehek, 2009).

Second, the rejection of the group is perceived as intentional. The experiences of Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold serve as a good example because they were actively shunned by their peers. Research has shown that being intentionally rejected affects individuals more negatively than being incidentally rejected. In one experiment, some participants were told that a group voted to work with him or her, but because the group had already reached its maximum size, he or she would be required to work alone. Participants in this condition fared better than participants who were told that others explicitly voted not to work with them (Baumeister, DeWall, Ciarocco, & Twenge, 2005). Importantly, it is the perception of intentionality that matters. If a group perceives incidental rejection as intentional, it is expected to respond similarly to groups that are intentionally rejected.

Third, the source of marginalization is multiple out-group others. Our use of the phrase "multiple out-group others" is purposely broad and refers to a number of people outside the rejected group that act or are perceived to act malevolently toward a target group (i.e., the marginalized group). These multiple out-group others may not be an intact group, yet they share an identity, and in the interaction context generally have more members than the marginalized group. For example, small groups of Muslims in the United States may find themselves marginalized by Christian communities in which they reside (Sageman, 2008). Similarly, an existing group may be divided by conflict such that a small faction becomes a target of marginalization by the remainder of the group. Task forces formed from a larger group of employees in the same organization may find themselves marginalized by their colleagues. Notably, targets of marginalization remain targets regardless of whether they respect the source. In one study, individuals ostracized by a despised out-group (the Ku Klux Klan) still experienced emotional distress (Gonsalkorale & Williams, 2006). Many groups do not respect the sources of the marginalization and yet react anyway. Our notion of what constitutes a source of marginalization is notably broad, but it is not all inclusive. Few groups are unanimously accepted and included by all others. Marginalization reflects the active, intentional rejection of an intact group by a generally larger number of others from whom they might otherwise be accepted.

Defining characteristics and examples of marginalized groups are presented here to exemplify the unique phenomenon that we are investigating. Still, the study of group

marginalization is clearly similar to many other areas of investigation. Smart Richman and Leary (2009) pointed out that similar work " . . . appears under the guise of a variety of different phenomena such as ostracism, exclusion, rejection, discrimination, stigmatization, prejudice, betrayal, unrequited love, peer rejection, bullying, neglect, loneliness, homesickness, and humiliation" (p. 365). It would be unwise to ignore these literatures, especially when one acknowledges the paucity of research specifically addressing the marginalization of small groups. As an example, the rejection-identification model is based on the reactions of collectives such as those defined by race or gender (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999). Although referencing different processes, the rejection-identification model and others like it provide us with insight regarding the marginalization of small groups.

We carefully and intentionally chose the term "marginalized" to describe the groups of interest that are targets of rejection. When one examines the state of related literatures, rejected groups are traditionally described as marginalized (e.g., Baur, Abma, & Widdershoven, 2010; Bhopal, 2010; Sherry, 2010). Marginalization tends to be associated with groups outside of these literatures as well. Entering the term marginalization (without the term group) into popular search engines produces links to websites about rejected groups such as Aboriginal communities and recommends that we also use the search terms "marginalized groups" and "marginalized population." In contrast, rejected individuals are rarely described as "marginalized," except when their rejection is linked to membership in a social group. Rather, individuals are described as "rejected" or "ostracized" (e.g., Baumeister et al., 2005; Williams, 2001). Internet searches of terms like "rejected" and "ostracized" are also coupled with the notion of an individual as the target. To be consistent with these traditional uses of the terms, we describe groups as marginalized and individuals as rejected or ostracized. However, for stylistic reasons, we retain the term "interpersonal rejection" when referring to individuals and groups simultaneously. Given these defining characteristics of marginalized groups, we next examine why group marginalization matters.

Group Marginalization as a Threat to Psychological Need Fulfillment

A key assumption of this article is that people value social connectedness. All psychologically normal people seek out personal relationships, cherish the relationships they have, and have negative feelings when these relationships deteriorate (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Blackhart et al., 2009). Evidence for this assumption is readily observed in a variety of social contexts including graduation ceremonies, "reality" television shows, and social networking sites. Moreover, several converging lines of evidence indicate that social connectedness may be a fundamental human need (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Similar to being deprived of food or water, social deprivation can result in untoward physical and psychological consequences. For instance, House, Landis, and Umberson (1988) summarized evidence that social deprivation is associated with reduced longevity. Cacioppo and Patrick (2008) and Leary (2001) summarized evidence that long-term rejection among individuals is associated with unhappiness and loneliness.

Interpersonal rejection is probably the most direct method of threatening this sense of social connectedness. In typical rejection paradigms, targets are explicitly left out of a social activity, threatened with possible rejection, informed that they are likely to end up alone later in life, or asked to imagine episodes of rejection (Blackhart et al., 2009). In contrast to the social disconnection associated with social deprivation more generally, the rejection captured by these paradigms serves as a direct indication that an individual is not accepted by others. Members of small marginalized groups presumably perceive threats to their sense of social connectedness as well. Yet, in contrast to individuals, threatened needs may be partially maintained through social connections with cotargets who share the rejection. As a result, processes and outcomes associated with rejection for individuals and small groups may differ. Williams' (2001, 2009) model of social ostracism and Leary's (2001) conceptualization of relational evaluation help us to assess threats faced by targets of group marginalization.

A Model of Social Ostracism

Williams (2001, 2009) proposed a need-threat model for understanding the effects of social ostracism on individuals. The full model encapsulates taxonomic dimensions, antecedents, mediators, moderators, threatened need fulfillment, and reactions to ostracism. However, we focus our discussion on the aspects of this model concerning threats to need fulfillment and reactions to ostracism. Prior to the development of Williams' (2001) model, significant evidence already demonstrated the importance of belonging (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), self-esteem (Bandura, 1997), control (Burger, 1992; Seligman, 1975), and meaningful existence (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986) for psychological and physical well-being. Williams (2001) argued that ostracism is an experience that can simultaneously threaten each of these fundamental needs.

Threats to belonging. Perhaps most clearly, one's sense of belonging is threatened by ostracism. Baumeister and Leary (1995) argued that a need for belonging developed evolutionarily when reliance on others was essential for survival in terms of acquiring food, water, and other resources. Today, modern conveniences like grocery stores and motor vehicles make it possible for many of us to survive on our own, but not without anachronistic physical and psychological consequences that we inherited from our ancestors (House et al.,

1988; Leary, 2001). Baumeister and Leary described the need for belonging as a "pervasive drive to form and maintain at least a minimum quantity of lasting, positive, and significant interpersonal relationships" (p. 497). By definition, ostracism acts as a direct threat to such relationships.

Threats to belonging posed by ostracism should apply to individuals as well as to members of marginalized groups. Yet, group marginalization clearly poses a different experience given that the need for belonging can be fulfilled through identification with fellow group members who are cotargets of marginalization. Group members may perceive that the marginalized group of which they are a part does not belong among the larger population that rejects them, and yet retain their sense of belonging through connections within the marginalized group. Whereas rejected individuals face their experience alone or in a disconnected fashion from potentially supportive others, rejected group members can receive support from cotargets, even if this support is merely by presence alone.

Threats to self-esteem. Ostracism also threatens the self-esteem of targets. Arguments for the importance of self-esteem have been put forth by a number of theorists. Self-esteem has been linked to self-efficacy and mental health (Bandura, 1997), as well as initiative, resilience, and pleasant feelings (Baumeister, Campbell, Krueger, & Vohs, 2003). According to Williams (2001), the link between ostracism and self-esteem is in the implicit accusation that the target has done something wrong. Ostracism suggests that the target is bad or unwanted, which directly threatens the target's sense of self-worth.

Again, rejected individuals and members of marginalized groups should experience threats to their self-esteem, and yet group marginalization should be experienced differently given that others in one's group are similarly targeted. For individuals lacking access to supportive others, interpersonal rejection may be easily internalized and consequently reduce self-esteem. In contrast, members of marginalized groups face contrasting messages. Whereas rejection from multiple out-group others implies that members of a marginalized group have done something wrong or are undesirable people, their membership within the marginalized group suggests that they share this experience and are not alone in their feelings, beliefs, and actions. Abundant research confirms that just one other like-minded individual is sufficient to resist conformity pressures from a majority (e.g., Allen & Levine, 1969). Changing one's behavior to conform to expectations of the sources of marginalization is unnecessary when one is a member of a group that shares those behaviors. Whereas rejected individuals without the immediate support of others may experience a threat to their self-esteem, the self-esteem of rejected group members can be simultaneously threatened and supported given their unique social milieu.

Further supporting the relationship between self-esteem and group involvement, Hogg, Hohman, and Rivera (2008) identified three motivational accounts for group membership, one of which is to secure self-esteem. This account is consistent with sociometer theory, which suggests that self-esteem acts as a meter of our acceptance or rejection by others (Leary & Baumeister, 2000). Whereas rejection threatens self-esteem, group membership maintains self-esteem. In one experiment designed to test this prediction, participants were asked to join a new group in which acceptance was either guaranteed or dependent on a number of factors. Results indicated that participants with lower self-esteem showed a strong preference for the group that guaranteed acceptance (Anthony, Wood, & Holmes, 2005). Following threats to self-esteem associated with group marginalization, identification and involvement with one's group may be appealing.

Threats to control. Williams (2001, 2009) provided evidence that a person's sense of control is also threatened by ostracism. The importance of fulfilling control needs has been demonstrated by numerous researchers (e.g., Burger, 1992; Seligman, 1975). Seligman (1975) demonstrated that when perceptions of control are diminished extensively, learned helplessness and depression often result. More recently, Williams and Govan (2005) argued that targets of rejection often seek to restore their need for control through aggressive retaliation. Individuals who are targets of ostracism lose control over the nature of their relationship with the source as well as any resources the source controls. Moreover, the source of the ostracism can control the target's attributions regarding the reasons for the ostracism (Williams, 2001). For example, the source may leave the target unaware as to why the ostracism is occurring, or even as to whether it is occurring.

Members of marginalized groups should experience threats to their sense of control just as rejected individuals do, but feelings of control may be maintained by their association with the marginalized group. Evidence for this can be found in another motivational account for group membership described by Hogg et al. (2008). Uncertainty-identity theory suggests that people face uncertainty about themselves and the world in which they live (Hogg, 2007). Group membership may reduce this uncertainty through group norms that prescribe feelings, beliefs, and behaviors for members (Herriot, 2007). So, whereas rejection threatens one's sense of control in an unpredictable world, group membership maintains this sense of control by guiding feelings, thoughts, and actions of members and consequently reducing ambiguity in the situation.

Further supporting this perspective, Park and Hinsz (2006) argued that groups provide a sense of strength and safety in numbers for their members. Historically, banding together in groups served as a defense against unfavorable circumstances such as attacks by predators and acquiring scarce resources. Today, groups still provide their members with a sense of strength and safety through the readily available rewards,

resources, security, and support they provide. When a group is marginalized, its members are accompanied by a figurative, and sometimes literal, fighting force that limits any threats to their sense of control. Clearly, group marginalization, like individual rejection, can result in needs of control becoming more salient.

Threats to meaningful existence. Ostracism is also known to threaten one's sense of meaningful existence (Williams, 2001). James (1890), Williams (2001), and others have suggested that ostracism serves as a metaphor for what life would be like if one did not exist. Reminiscent of Charles Dickens' *A Christmas Carol*, ostracized individuals observe other people act without participating in the interaction themselves (Williams, 2001). By observing these actions without direct interaction, ostracized individuals become aware that life for others continues without their involvement, thus threatening their sense of meaningful existence.

Members of marginalized groups should similarly perceive threats toward their sense of meaningful existence. Yet, group members are likely to react differently to these threats than individuals because of the presence of similar cotargets. Hogg et al. (2008) considered the possibility that group membership buffers fears of one's own death. This perspective, endorsed by terror management theory (Greenberg et al., 1986) but not endorsed by Hogg et al., suggests that group membership provides a figurative sense of immortality through its members' endorsement of ideological views that outlast the lives of their adherents. Research suggests that it is nearly impossible to change strongly held views, such as those concerning religious faith (Festinger, Riecken, & Schacter, 1956). A more likely response from groups facing marginalization may be psychological reactance, the motive to restore one's sense of freedom when it is threatened (Brehm & Brehm, 1981). Kruglanski et al. (2009) suggested that motivation for suicide bombers stems from the quest for significance in the eyes of those with whom they identify. Similarly, Herriot (2007) suggested that violent religious fundamentalists perceive themselves as in a fight for the survival of their faith. Threats to meaningful existence posed by group marginalization may result in efforts to restore members' sense of significance across many domains.

Threats to Relational Evaluation

A more general way to conceptualize psychological threats following interpersonal rejection is in terms of relational evaluation, or "the degree to which a person regards his or her relationship with another individual as valuable, important, or close" (Leary, 2001, p. 6). Relational evaluation ranges from very high to very low—the former connoting outright acceptance and the latter connoting outright rejection (Leary, 2001; Leary, Twenge, & Quinlivan, 2006). The construct of relational evaluation eliminates unnecessary dichotomization by reconceptualizing the notions of acceptance and rejection as falling along a continuum. To speak of a target as "rejected" does not account for the degree of rejection that is experienced by the target. Nor does it account for the fact that targets may simultaneously be rejected by some and accepted by others. For instance, Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold were rejected by their peers and yet accepted by one another (Kurtis, 2007). It is worthwhile to consider the degree to which peers reject individuals and whether this rejection is global (i.e., rejected by all) or selective (i.e., rejected by only some).

Relational evaluation is particularly relevant to cases of group marginalization whereby group members are rejected by multiple out-group others and yet accepted by their cotargets. In regard to the fundamental psychological needs, we suggest that one's sense of belonging, self-esteem, control, and meaningful existence may be threatened by group marginalization and yet maintained by supportive others within the marginalized group. In a more general fashion, one's sense of relational evaluation may likewise be threatened by group marginalization and maintained by supportive others in the marginalized group.

Group Identification and Psychological Well-Being

The most notable aspect of the preceding discussion regarding fundamental needs concerns the psychological reactions of group members to their collective marginalization. To some degree, threats to psychological need fulfillment prompted by group marginalization can be minimized through identification with the marginalized group. Members of small marginalized groups may reassert their threatened sense of acceptance and value through identification with cotargets in their group. We examine these patterns of relationships associated with identifying with an in-group in more depth below.

Branscombe et al. (1999) proposed a rejection-identification model that has direct implications for understanding reactions to marginalization. Using social identity theory as a basis, the rejection-identification model demonstrates that people who are rejected based on their group membership often increase their identification with the rejected group. Moreover, the model predicts that this increased identification can promote psychological well-being. These predictions are consistent with our discussion thus far. If one's belonging, self-esteem, control, and meaningful existence needs are threatened by the marginalization of one's group, and these needs can be maintained through identification with the group in which that person is a member, then rejected persons might cope by increasing their identification with the marginalized group.

Consistent with predictions of the rejection-identification model, members of minority groups that recognize prejudice

directed toward them consistently exhibit enhanced group identification. Research supports this notion for Jews (Dion & Earn, 1975), women (Gurin & Townsend, 1986), African Americans (Sanders Thompson, 1990), Hispanics (Chavira & Phinney, 1991), lesbians (Crosby, Pufall, Snyder, O'Connell, & Whalen, 1989), gay men (Simon et al., 1998), nonmainstream college groups (Cozzarelli & Karafa, 1998), and members of other minority groups. For example, Simon et al. (1998) found that simply reminding gay men that mainstream society devalued them led to an increase in their identification with the gay movement. Jetten, Branscombe, Schmitt, and Spears (2001) found similar results among people with body piercings. Whether increased group identification results among members of these groups depends partially on whether the threat is perceived as coming from isolated individuals or multiple out-group members (Abelson, Dasgupta, Park, & Banaji, 1998). When threats are perceived as coming from isolated individuals, members of devalued groups respond individually without increased group identification (Abelson et al., 1998). If threats are instead perceived as coming from multiple out-group members, increased group identification and collective responses result (Abelson et al., 1998). Importantly, the groups being considered here face marginalization from multiple out-group members.

Evidence for increased group identification following group marginalization is currently restricted to large social groups such as those defined by race or gender. Yet, similar patterns should emerge among smaller, intact groups such as those that develop into terrorist cells or gangs. Small, intact groups may even exhibit greater group identification following marginalization given their direct contact and familiarity with one another. Members of small groups often develop attraction to one another and pride in the group itself (Gastil, 2010). This is especially true within homogeneous groups whose members are similar on important features (Cartwright, 1968). In an examination of religious fundamentalism, Herriot (2007) argued that perception of oneself as part of a minority can strengthen the belief that one belongs. One can imagine that marginalized groups whose members share common radical religious or political ideologies may become quite cohesive given opportunities to discuss their views (Festinger et al., 1956) and commiserate about sources of marginalization (Gray, Ishii, & Ambady, 2011).

These relationships between group identification and psychological well-being are nicely illustrated in a *Newsweek* interview with Hafiz Hanif, a member of a terrorist cell linked with al Qaeda (Yousafzai & Moreau, 2010). The ideology and mission of al Qaeda has faced broad criticism and rejection from much of the world, including regions in which the organization resides (Jamjoom, 2010). Despite this rejection, Hanif exhibited a strong sense of belonging, self-esteem, control, and meaningful existence that appears to stem from his membership in al Qaeda. For example, talking about al Qaeda training camps, he energetically described the camaraderie associated with high-spirited volleyball matches, hunting and cooking small game, and visiting militant-controlled shops and homes. Membership in al Qaeda clearly boosted his sense of belonging. He also described preferred recruits as smart kids who could follow orders and stay calm. Presumably, he saw himself in this light as well, indicating high self-esteem. His training also provided him with a sense of control. Hanif trained in an immensely dangerous environment in which he estimated that U.S. controlled drones had killed about 80 al Qaeda members. Yet, despite these threats, he said that he learned from al Qaeda how to operate vehicles, defend himself using a knife and an AK-47, and make suicide vests. Finally, membership in al Qaeda provided Hanif with a sense of meaningful existence. In the interview, he described his aspirations to become a martyr. Hanif described not only his willingness, but also his desire to die for al Qaeda and its goals. In sum, membership in al Qaeda for Hanif appears to have helped to maintain each of the psychological needs threatened by the rejection of the organization and its goals.

Relationships between group identification and psychological well-being can be seen in many gangs as well. Bennett (2009) interviewed gang members and public figures in Compton, California. These interviews are relevant to the current discussion because, like terrorist organizations, violent gangs may develop partly because select youth feel a shared sense of rejection by the societies in which they reside (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011). Bennett's interviews of these gang members and public figures make apparent that gang membership can help to maintain psychological needs that are threatened by this rejection. For example, one gang member described gang life as a "brotherhood." Another said, "You just want to feel like you're part of something." These quotes suggest a sense of belonging that stems from gang membership. Addressing self-esteem, Professor Malcolm Klein said, "gangs suggest that they can achieve something where they are, when they are" (Bennett, 2009). Feelings of control are maintained as well. One gang member stated simply, "Protection. We took care of our block." Another said, " . . . you get knowledge of the streets." Although these particular interviews do not directly indicate that a sense of meaningful existence stems from gang membership, this need is likely maintained by gang membership as well. Despite the broad rejection of gangs by the communities in which they reside, membership within them appears to be beneficial for many.

In sum, members of terrorist cells, gangs, and other tightly knit groups can be expected to exhibit increased group identification following marginalization. In turn, members of such groups are believed to reassert their threatened sense of acceptance and value through identification with cotargets in their group. Next, we see how these processes might promote hostile reactions toward the source of their group's marginalization.

Hostile Reactions to Group Marginalization

Williams and Govan (2005) showed that targets of ostracism react toward the source by seeking reinclusion or by aggression. Other researchers add that targets of rejection may also react with avoidance (Maner, DeWall, Baumeister, & Schaller, 2007; Smart Richman & Leary, 2009). Examples of seeking reinclusion include working harder on group tasks, accepting group perceptions more quickly, and being more sensitive to information about others. Examples of aggressing include yelling at the source of rejection and physical attacks. Avoidance may involve the rejected individual ceasing further contact with the source of rejection and possibly others whose acceptance of him or her is in doubt. Ultimately, reactions to interpersonal rejection will be prosocial, antisocial, or avoidant. Reactions to group marginalization may be prosocial, antisocial, or avoidant as well. However, we hope to illustrate that hostility will be a more common response among marginalized groups than among rejected individuals.

As noted, group marginalization acts as a threat to members' sense of belonging, self-esteem, control, and meaningful existence, and more generally, to their sense of relational evaluation. Group identification is believed to help maintain these same psychological needs. Consequently, there is incentive for members of marginalized groups to identify strongly with one another. Within the marginalized group, members can question the reasonableness of their rejection by the source (Foster & Matheson, 1995; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011). Likewise, members might dismiss the actions of the source as unfair (Foster & Matheson, 1995; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011). In each of these types of responses, the group members react to the marginalization by externalizing their attribution for it. Importantly, group identification and sufficient levels of psychological need fulfillment are probably necessary for these types of reactions to occur. Enhanced group identification with depressed psychological need states might promote internal attributions for the marginalization (such as feelings of guilt) rather than external attributions (such as feelings of anger; McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011). Likewise, fulfilled psychological needs without group identification would not be conducive to a group-based response. Consequently, we believe that threats to psychological needs and opportunities for group identification contribute to how members of marginalized groups respond to marginalization. In the following sections, we examine affective, cognitive, and behavioral reactions to group marginalization and articulate how these responses are likely to be hostile.

Hostile Affect and Behavior

Williams' (2001, 2009) need-threat model suggests that immediate reactions to ostracism are relatively cognition-free, and may involve hurt feelings, anger, damaged mood, and physiological arousal. Similarly, Leary (2001) suggested that low perceived relational evaluation is virtually always accompanied by emotional distress. The notion that rejection negatively impacts affective states is presumed to be equally true among members of marginalized groups as it is among rejected individuals. Yet, the nature of affective states that emerge might differ quite markedly in the two cases. In particular, some affective states might be more likely to emerge among members of marginalized groups than among rejected individuals.

Anger, fear, and frustration may be particularly potent among members of marginalized groups. We have already articulated how members of marginalized groups face threats to their psychological needs that are inconsistent with messages provided by their group. In many cases, this inconsistency will be perceived as a sign of slight or insult, an outcome Aristotle and others have tied to anger and a desire for revenge (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011). Herriot (2007) instead linked group-based threats to fear, perhaps for the well-being or survival of one's group, which is perceived as an extension of oneself. More generally, the frustration–aggression hypothesis contends that any type of frustration can increase the probability of an aggressive response (Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939). If members of marginalized groups feel that their goals are impeded by the source of marginalization, they may become angry or fearful and seek to retaliate.

Sympathy and empathy are two other emotions that may be experienced by members of marginalized groups. In their analysis of radicalization processes, McCauley and Moskalenko (2011) noted that those who support their group in the most extreme ways also tend to be the most sympathetic and empathic toward their group and its suffering at the hands of others. As an example, they described the case of Russian Vera Zazulich who in 1877 killed the governor of St. Petersburg after learning that he inhumanely punished a fellow antigovernment protestor. Likewise, these researchers described the case of American-born terrorist Omar Hammami who, motivated by sympathy for fellow Muslims he saw as victims of the U.S.-led war on terror, transitioned from a passionate university student to a leader of the terrorist organization al Shabab in Somalia. Much like anger, sympathy and empathy toward cotargets may promote aggressive action toward a source of marginalization. Of course, other affective states may promote aggression toward sources of marginalization as well. We anticipate that the study of links between group marginalization and specific affective states will be a fruitful area for future research.

Hostile Cognitions and Behavior

Our previous discussion suggests that group members exhibit hostile affective states as a result of their group's marginalization. Moreover, these affective states appear to be closely

linked with associated cognitions. Williams (2001) suggested that after an ostracism episode, targets ask themselves why they are being rejected and feel driven to fulfill their psychological needs of belonging, self-esteem, control, and meaningful existence. Likewise, Leary (2001) suggested that people desire to maintain high positive relational evaluation when it is threatened. Indeed, many researchers argue that hostile cognitions are the driving force behind hostile behavior (e.g., DeWall, Twenge, Gitter, & Baumeister, 2009). We will focus on two models that help explain how cognitions might promote hostile behavior among members of marginalized groups. The first model emphasizes implicit and explicit attitudes toward the source of marginalization, and the second model emphasizes how group members construe their marginalization experiences.

A dual attitudes model. Wilson, Lindsey, and Schooler (2000) proposed that people sometimes exhibit more than one evaluation toward a particular attitude object. Dual attitudes, one explicit and one implicit, operate simultaneously with the latter being more ingrained and automatic. For example, one might exhibit an explicit attitude that favors equal opportunities for members of different races and yet also harbor a contrasting implicit attitude that favors members of one's own race over others. These researchers argued that whether one attitude or the other is expressed depends on cognitive capacity. Cognitive capacity refers to the ability to process and respond to information given that one's attention is simultaneously taxed by other stimuli in one's internal and external environments. High levels of cognitive capacity allow one to override implicit attitudes in favor of explicit attitudes.

Consistent with these notions, Williams and Govan (2005) suggested that rejected individuals may hold disparate implicit and explicit attitudes toward the source of their rejection. They reasoned that individuals have an implicit attitude that favors retaliation and an explicit attitude that favors ingratiation. Moreover, the attitude expressed in the rejected individual's behavior is presumed to depend on the person's current level of cognitive capacity. Implicit attitudes are expected to lead to aggressive reactions unless the rejected individual has the cognitive capacity to override this default reaction. Similarly, DeWall, Finkel, and Denson (2011) argued that self-control inhibits aggression. If conditions arise that favor implicit attitudes to aggress, self-control may be necessary to override such impulses. In general, the dual attitudes model suggests that the behavior of rejected individuals will reflect explicit attitudes favoring ingratiation when cognitive capacity is high and implicit attitudes favoring aggression when cognitive capacity is low.

Partial support for these notions can be found in a study reported by Williams, Case, and Govan (2002). Following inclusion or ostracism from a simulated ball-tossing task, participants at an Australian university completed an implicit association test designed to examine prejudices toward Aboriginal and White Australians. In addition, participants completed explicit measures of prejudice toward these groups based on modern and old-fashioned forms of prejudice. Comparing included and ostracized participants on these implicit and explicit measures, researchers discovered that although included and ostracized individuals were equally prosocial in their responses to the explicit measure, ostracized participants responded with higher levels of prejudice on the implicit measure. Consistent with Williams and Govan's (2005) model, these participants exhibited contrasting implicit and explicit attitudes toward Aboriginal Australians.

Like individuals, members of marginalized groups might also exhibit incongruent implicit and explicit attitudes toward sources of marginalization. Implicit attitudes favoring aggression against the source of marginalization could be quite potent among group members. Explicit attitudes favoring ingratiation might also be present, in which case, greater cognitive capacity might be required to override the implicit desire to aggress. Research demonstrates that group members exhibit less cognitive capacity than individuals due to the additional demands group situations place on their members (Hinsz, Tindale, & Vollrath, 1997). Whereas individuals may be able to focus exclusively on a given task, group members divide their attention between the task and group-related concerns such as impression management. Reduced cognitive capacity among members of marginalized groups who are also managing multiple features of the social situation may increase a group's tendency to retaliate.

Alternatively, members of marginalized groups may exhibit implicit and explicit attitudes favoring aggression. Members of marginalized groups may feel little explicit need to ingratiate given that threats to psychological need fulfillment are buffered through membership in their rejected group. Thus, implicit and explicit attitudes favoring aggression against the source of marginalization may be identically hostile. Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold expressed blatantly hostile explicit attitudes toward peers who rejected them. Similarly, Hafiz Hanif expressed blatantly hostile explicit attitudes toward targets identified by al Qaeda. Individuals might also exhibit hostile explicit and implicit attitudes toward sources of rejection. However, this attitude pattern seems more likely to be the case for members of marginalized groups than for rejected individuals given that the latter lack the immediate support of others.

A multimotive model. In their multimotive model, Smart Richman and Leary (2009) suggested that whether individual targets of rejection react in a prosocial, antisocial, or avoidant manner depends on how they *construe* their rejection. They identified six construals that can be made in such a situation. These include (a) the perceived cost of rejection, (b) the possibility of alternative relationships, (c) expectations of relational repair, (d) the value of the relationship, (e) the chronicity and pervasiveness of the rejection, and (f) the perceived unfairness of the rejection

Table 1. Construals and Anticipated Behavioral Reactions Following Episodes of Interpersonal Rejection.

Construal	Individual reactions to rejection	Predicted group reactions to rejection
Perceived cost of rejection	Prosocial reactions likely when perceived cost of rejection is high	Lower perceived cost of rejection may discourage prosocial reactions
Possibility of alternative relationships	Avoidant reactions likely when alternative relationships are available	Availability of alternative relationships with similar others in marginalized group may encourage avoidant reactions
Expectations of relational repair	Prosocial reactions likely when expectations of relational repair are high; antisocial and avoidant reactions likely when expectations of relational repair are low	Group members may tend to perceive relational repair as unlikely, motivating antisocial or avoidant reactions
Value of relationships	Prosocial reactions likely when relationships are highly valued; antisocial or avoidant reactions likely when relationships are not highly valued	Lower value placed on relationships with sources of rejection may encourage antisocial or avoidant reactions
Chronicity/pervasiveness	Avoidant reactions likely when rejection is chronic/pervasive	Situation-dependent; avoidant reactions likely when rejection is chronic/pervasive
Perceived unfairness	Antisocial reactions likely when rejection is perceived as unfair	Group members may be more likely than individuals to perceive rejection as unfair, motivating antisocial reactions

episode. Extending their analysis, we can examine how group members and individuals might construe rejection experiences differently.

A full summary of construals made by individuals following rejection is summarized in the first two columns of Table 1. Referring to these columns, first consider the value of relationships between sources and targets. If the source of rejection is an important other whose acceptance is desired, then the rejected individual is likely to react in ways that restore the relationship. If instead the value of the relationship is low, then an antisocial or avoidant reaction may be more likely. Predictions become more complex when another construal is added to the mix. By itself, high expectations for relational repair would lead to prosocial reactions and low expectations for relational repair would lead to antisocial or avoidant reactions. However, situations also exist in which the relationship is highly valued but the expectation for relational repair is very low (a combination of variables that may result in the deterioration of an intimate relationship; Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Thus, the various construals made by rejected individuals may have an interactive effect on whether they respond in a prosocial, antisocial, or avoidant manner.

Smart Richman and Leary (2009) provided convincing arguments for the validity of their multimotive model. Consider the manner in which rejected persons construe the possibility of alternative relationships. Smart Richman and Leary (2009) stated,

> . . . the belongingness motive is characterized by substitutability in the sense that new relationships and memberships can psychologically replace those that have ended. When this happens, the person's reaction to the rejection—whether it is initially prosocial, antisocial, or avoidant—diminishes in intensity. The previous relationship becomes less important, and the rejection is less salient as new relationships emerge." (p. 370)

When rejected, one can seek out relationships with others who are more approving. In the case of divorce, one study found that 50% of divorcees started dating prior to even filing for divorce (E. R. Anderson et al., 2004). Similarly, victims of discrimination often cope through group-based identification (Branscombe et al., 1999). If the rejected individual perceives that other relationship options are available, this may influence how they construe the rejection episode, and ultimately how they react.

The third column of Table 1 extends the analysis of Smart Richman and Leary (2009) by hypothesizing how groups might react to marginalization given the construals of their members. One particular construal is pivotal for understanding group reactions to marginalization. Inherently, the possibility of alternative relationships is great for members of rejected groups. Individuals may be completely alone in their rejection or at least separated from the immediate support of amicable others (Maner et al., 2007). In contrast, members of marginalized groups can immediately relate to one another as cotargets. Consequently, members of marginalized groups have less incentive than rejected individuals to respond prosocially toward those who reject them. As can be seen below, this construal may then influence other construals among members of marginalized groups.

For individuals, we focused on relational value and expectations for relational repair. Greater value placed on the relationship should lead to more prosocial reactions for individuals and group members. But in contrast to individuals, group members may tend to place less value on their relationships with sources of rejection because needs threatened by the rejection can be satisfied by relationships within

the marginalized group. And if group members place less value on relationships with sources of rejection, they should be less likely to respond to rejection prosocially. Antisocial or avoidant reactions should be more likely.

Similarly, rejected group members and individuals may exhibit different expectations for relational repair with the source of their rejection. Hoyle, Pinkley, and Insko (1989) provided evidence that participants anticipating interaction with a group expected more hostility than participants anticipating interaction with an individual. Other research finds an interindividual–intergroup discontinuity whereby intergroup interactions tend to be more aggressive (Meier & Hinsz, 2004) and competitive (Wildschut et al., 2003) than interindividual interactions. Interactions between groups and individuals also tend to be more competitive and aggressive than interactions among individuals alone (Meier & Hinsz, 2004; Morgan & Tindale, 2002). If intergroup interactions tend to promote expectations for hostility and tend to be more hostile, then members of marginalized groups may perceive the likelihood of relational repair with sources of their rejection to be less than similarly treated individuals. And again, if expectations for relational repair are low, aggressive or avoidant responses may occur.

Prosocial reactions are expected to emerge when the perceived costs of rejection are high. Relative to rejected individuals, the perceived costs of rejection for members of marginalized groups may be lower on average if costs associated with the rejection are offset by acceptance within the marginalized group. Whether these costs concern intangible resources such as feelings of belonging or tangible resources such as goods or capital, group membership should reduce the perceived threats posed by sources of rejection. We recognize that exceptions to this tendency will occur, such as when groups have to rely upon the sources of marginalization to supply highly desirable or necessary resources. Yet generally, marginalized groups may be less likely than rejected individuals to perceive the costs of rejection as high, and thus these groups may be less likely to respond in a prosocial manner.

Another construal suggests that aggressive reactions can be expected when rejection is perceived as unfair. Williams (2001) suggested that ostracism threatens self-esteem through its implicit accusation that the target has done something wrong. This should be true for marginalized groups as well. Yet membership within a marginalized group suggests that members are not alone in their feelings, beliefs, and actions. Given that support from comembers is available, members of marginalized groups may be motivated to challenge the implicit accusation that they have done something wrong. Marginalized group members may externalize their attributions about the causes of their rejection, placing blame on the source of the marginalization. Given that anger is a common emotional response to being treated unfairly in an interaction (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011), members of marginalized groups may be likely to exhibit antisocial reactions toward those they perceive as the sources of their marginalization.

Finally, chronic or pervasive rejection is expected to lead to avoidant reactions. Chronicity and pervasiveness objectively vary by situation, and thus, we hesitate to draw predictions for this construal. Yet rejected group members and individuals may differ in how they construe the chronicity and pervasiveness of rejection. For example, the presence of cotargets may lead members of marginalized groups to commiserate about their shared rejection. By discussing the situation among themselves, the marginalized group members may come to believe that the rejection they experience is particularly chronic and pervasive (i.e., group polarization; Myers & Lamm, 1976). Alternatively, the presence of cotargets may act as a source of distraction for members of marginalized groups (Baron, 1986; Hinsz et al., 1997) and thus result in perceptions that their rejection is less chronic or pervasive than would similarly treated individuals. Research is needed to determine the nature of construals that are likely to occur.

Notably, not all construals will lead marginalized groups to react antisocially. Some construals merely reduce the likelihood of a prosocial reaction or increase the likelihood of an avoidant reaction. If members of marginalized groups perceive the costs of rejection to be low, for example, an antisocial reaction should not be expected. Rather, an avoidant reaction is more likely because the marginalization is perceived as relatively unthreatening. Yet, other construals do lead to antisocial reactions. If group members perceive rejection as unfair, for example, they should be expected to react aggressively toward the sources of the rejection. Our prediction that marginalized groups will be particularly likely to react antisocially follows from an expectation about the combined influence of the various construals that follow rejection. Some construals appear to reduce the likelihood of prosocial reaction. Other construals appear to increase the likelihood of avoidant reactions. Still other construals appear to increase the likelihood of antisocial reactions. Future research is necessary for understanding the pattern of group responses when different construals arise during marginalization experiences.

Summary

We argue that reactions to group marginalization are likely to be more hostile than those of rejected individuals. Part of this hostility is affective, such as increased anger or fear toward sources of marginalization and increased empathy and sympathy for cotargets. Part of the hostility is cognitive. Based on the dual attitudes model, we argue that because group members tend to have less cognitive capacity than individuals, they may be less able to override implicit tendencies to aggress against sources of their marginalization. Or alternatively, members of marginalized groups may exhibit hostile implicit and explicit attitudes that favor aggression. From the



Figure 1. An integrative framework for understanding hostile reactions to group marginalization.

multimotive model, we suggest that members of marginalized groups may be particularly likely to construe their rejection in a hostile manner. Of greatest consequence, however, is hostile behavior. Our analysis suggests that groups and their members are likely to react aggressively toward the sources of their marginalization. Next, we present an integrative framework for understanding group marginalization and suggest directions for future research.

An Integrative Framework for Understanding Hostile Reactions to Group Marginalization

Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold killed 13 people and injured 21 others during their massacre at Columbine High School. The Threat Assessment Group task force assigned to the case offered the explanation that Harris and Klebold reinforced one another's hostile attitudes toward peers who rejected them and it was only through their shared rejection and commiseration that such a drastic outcome could have resulted. Our analysis integrates evidence from literature reviews, empirical studies, narratives, and other sources to lead us to a similar conclusion. Relative to similarly treated individuals, small groups and their members appear particularly likely to aggress against the source of their marginalization. The purpose of this section is to describe an integrative framework for understanding these hostile reactions.

Our integrative framework for understanding hostile reactions to group marginalization is summarized in Figure 1. Starting at the top left of this figure, we see that group marginalization threatens one's sense of belonging, self-esteem, control, and meaningful existence. On a more general level, one's sense of positive relational evaluation is threatened as well. To the top right of the framework, we see that group marginalization also promotes group identification. Threatened psychological need fulfillment and enhanced group identification have a reciprocal relationship. Threatened psychological need fulfillment promotes group identification and enhanced group identification can help satisfy psychological needs. Together, enhanced group identification and fulfilled psychological needs reflect unique reactions to rejection that occur among members of marginalized groups.

Members of marginalized groups may then begin to exhibit affective states such as anger or fear toward the source of their rejection as well as sympathy and empathy for their cotargets. These affective states may directly influence

hostile behavior toward the source of the marginalization. From the dual attitudes model, inconsistencies between feedback provided by sources of marginalization and cotargets may promote implicit attitudes that favor aggression against the source. Group processes that affect cognitive capacity may then lead to difficulty suppressing such implicit attitudes. Or alternatively, implicit and explicit attitudes favoring aggression may combine to promote hostile behavior. From the multimotive model, the ways in which group members construe their marginalization will also influence their reactions. Involvement in the marginalized group may lead group members to (a) perceive the costs of marginalization as lower, (b) more easily perceive the possibility of alternative relationships, (c) have reduced expectations for relational repair with the source, (d) decrease the value of relationships with the source, and (e) perceive the marginalization as unfair. Because chronicity and pervasiveness varies by situation, we hesitate to make predictions for this construal. However, we suggest some possibilities that may occur such as the availability of cotargets promoting commiseration about marginalization experiences and consequent intensification of feelings about the chronicity and pervasiveness of the marginalization. In combination, these construals might promote hostile behavior toward sources of marginalization.

Figure 1 further illustrates that affect, attitudes, and construals will influence each other. As members commiserate about the unfairness of their marginalization, for example, they may become especially angry. Or as members become consumed by anger, their capacity to override implicit attitudes to aggress may be reduced. In combination, the result of these processes on reactions to group marginalization may be substantial. Hostile affect and cognitions are predicted to promote hostile behavior toward the source of marginalization (cf. C. A. Anderson & Bushman, 2002). Based on this integrative framework, episodes of marginalization can result in hostile behavior that might involve minor altercations such as those associated with school cliques, or violent and deadly actions associated with terrorist cells and gangs.

Directions for Future Research

We have sought to identify commonalities and differences between observations from the literature on individual-level rejection and describe how groups might react under similar circumstances. We advance numerous testable predictions and propose an integrative framework for understanding how small groups might react to marginalization. Although grounded in theory, all of these predictions require direct empirical examination. For instance, elements in our integrative framework and the relationships among them may require modification, new elements may need to be added, and it may be necessary to delete some elements. Here, we discuss a number of directions for research that might address the utility of our framework as well as empirical questions related to our larger analysis of group marginalization processes and outcomes.

In our integrative framework, we depict the relationship between group marginalization and group identification as unidirectional because that is the nature of the relationship between the constructs from the perspective of group marginalization as the initial experience. Yet, this relationship may in fact be bidirectional; group identification may exacerbate group marginalization as well. As members of marginalized groups spend more time interacting with members of their group, they often spend less time interacting with the source of marginalization. Any ongoing efforts to restore the relationship with the source may cease as well. Terrorist cells, for example, may initially develop from a set of individuals known to exhibit particular feelings, beliefs, and actions. Once marginalized for these feelings, beliefs, and actions, members begin to identify with one another and perhaps reinforce one another's views (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011; Myers & Lamm, 1976). Sources of marginalization may recognize that the feelings, beliefs, and actions of the marginalized group have become more extreme and accordingly feel greater confidence in their choice to marginalize them. Empirical tests of these potential relationships within the context of small marginalized groups would be useful.

Empirical tests might additionally reveal other group processes that contribute to hostility among members of marginalized groups. Meier, Hinsz, and Heimerdinger (2007) provided an in-depth analysis of the literature on group-based aggression and considered the impact of factors such as group accentuation and deindividuation on hostility. Group accentuation and group polarization suggest that group situations enhance members' preexisting tendencies (Hinsz, Tindale, & Nagao, 2008; Myers & Lamm, 1976). If group accentuation is present within rejection scenarios, any hostile cognitions, negative affect, and arousal occurring among rejected individuals might be amplified within group settings. Research has also identified links between deindividuation and hostility in group contexts. Deindividuation has classically been defined as "a psychological state of decreased self-evaluation and decreased evaluation apprehension causing antinormative and disinhibited behavior" (Postmes & Spears, 1998, p. 238). Certainly, group settings can promote a sense of decreased self-awareness and evaluation apprehension that could foster hostility in group marginalization contexts (Leader, Mullen, & Abrams, 2007). However, self-evaluation and accountability may tend to be high in the small, often tight-knit groups examined here. Relatedly, violence in the name of one's group is sometimes committed in hopes of recognition; not always in hopes of avoiding it (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2011). Researchers seeking to investigate links between deindividuation and hostility are encouraged to attend to research on the SIDE model (i.e., social identity model of deindividuation effects), which thoroughly

accounts for these types of situation-specific norms (Postmes & Spears, 1998). Investigations into other relevant group processes are also likely to prove worthwhile.

Current research also reveals some limitations that constrain conceptual approaches to studying group marginalization. There are traditional approaches to attitudes toward groups that are found in the stereotyping and prejudice literature; however, these approaches have not been extended to potential group-level concepts such as the collective fundamental psychological needs. For example, social identity theory differentiates between personal and social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). The former concerns an individual's personal values, ideas, goals, and emotions while the latter concerns an individual's personal identity in relation to others. Therefore, the personal and social identities focus on individuals' evaluation of personal identity, whether in personal or interpersonal domains. Similarly, self-esteem is traditionally the focus of personal identity and only with the conceptual work of researchers such as Luhtanen and Crocker (1992) was self-esteem considered as it related to positivity of one's collective identity. The notion of collective self-esteem is useful because people often exhibit differential responses to a self-concept depending on whether it has a personal or collective focus. High personal self-esteem, for example, does not necessarily indicate high collective self-esteem. Greater conceptual efforts to consider potential group-level notions such as collective belonging (e.g., How much does my group belong?), collective control (e.g., How much control does my group possess?), and collective meaningful existence (e.g., How meaningful is the existence of my group?) may prove to be fruitful to research literatures outside of the marginalization of groups considered here.

It is also worthwhile to consider paradigms that might be applied to examine group marginalization. Existing interpersonal rejection paradigms used with individuals might be effective. Williams and Jarvis (2006) developed Cyberball to examine individual reactions to social ostracism. This paradigm places a naive individual into a virtual environment where they are asked to toss a ball with two other participants, ostensibly to assess mental visualization. Unbeknownst to the participant, the other "participants" are computer-operated and programmed to cease tossing the ball to him or her after a few rounds. Research conducted by Wirth and Williams (2009) suggests that this paradigm might be equally effective for examining members of marginalized groups. They modified computer-operated "participants" in Cyberball to exhibit no group identity, a temporary group identity, or a permanent group identity for this purpose. We tested another paradigm inspired by the In Game. Pratto, Pearson, Lee, and Saguy (2008) developed the In Game to study the use of power within dynamic interpersonal situations. Our specific interest in the In Game concerns its use as a tool to promote the marginalization of one party by others within dynamic interpersonal situations. Researchers may wish to adopt Cyberball, the modified In Game, or other paradigms to study group marginalization (e.g., Baumeister et al., 2005).

Our analysis might apply to groups that are willing to take *nonhostile* action against sources of marginalization. McCauley and Moskalenko (2011) suggested that the same processes that promote radicalization among terrorist groups may also be present among members of nonviolent groups associated with legal political activism. Social movements have been defined as "representing an effort by a large number of people to solve collectively a problem that they feel they have in common" (Toch, 1965, p. 5). Members of marginalized groups clearly share the problem of being rejected, and they may wish to solve this problem collectively through nonviolent means. Simon and collaborators (1998) examined the willingness of people in the United States and Germany to participate in legal collective action. Using correlational and experimental research approaches, they identified a causal link between high levels of collective identification and social movement participation. It would be worthwhile for future research to investigate differences between marginalized groups who take violent action and those who take nonviolent action in response to their plight.

Finally, it should be noted that group marginalization is obviously not the only factor that promotes hostile behavior, but rather one contributory factor. Numerous conceptual frameworks have been developed to identify factors that promote hostile behavior (e.g., the general aggression model, C. A. Anderson & Bushman, 2002). Noricks et al. (2009) found that precursors to terrorism include a belief by the acting group that violence is legitimate, substantial motivations on the part of the acting group, and the presence of social structures that permit terrorist acts. Bartlett, Birdwell, and King (2010) found that those drawn to violent religious radicalism tend to have a shallower understanding of religious tenets than religious radicals who do not engage in violence. A wide range of similar factors are known to contribute to antisocial acts perpetrated by other small groups such as juvenile gangs (Goldstein & Soriano, 1994), religious sects (McDaniel, 2007), and high school cliques (Miller, Holcomb, & Kraus, 2008). The presence of group marginalization might produce additive or interactive effects with these other factors. Our analysis and integrative framework provide an in-depth examination into group marginalization as a single factor, but clearly an important one.

Conclusion

Very little research has empirically examined the processes and outcomes associated with group marginalization. This is unfortunate considering the potential implications of group marginalization. Terrorist cells and violent gangs serve as just two examples of small groups whose development might stem from their members' shared rejection by mainstream society. Our conceptual review and integrative framework seek to promote understanding of how group marginalization

might lead to hostility toward sources of marginalization. We have also sought to stimulate new research on this topic. Although the processes linking group marginalization to hostility are complex, they are not beyond comprehension, and so we are eager to see empirical studies conducted that provide for a more complete understanding. It is essential that violent extremism and lesser forms of group-based aggression be understood and combated. We believe that the evidence summarized and predictions advanced in this article provide a significant contribution to the pursuit of this important goal.

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