# Attitudes towards Arab ascendance: Israeli and Global perspectives

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Attitudes towards Arab ascendancy: Israeli and Global perspectives

Abstract

Arab nations are decades behind many other previously colonized nations in developing stronger economies, more democratic institutions, and more autonomy and self-government, in part due to external interference. 2011 saw the potential for greater Arab autonomy through popular uprisings against autocratic governments in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain, and requests by Palestinians for state recognition by the U.N. We examined the psychology of support for Arab ascendancy among adults in 14 nations in the Balkans, the Middle East, Asia, Oceania, Europe, and the U.S. We predicted and found that people low on social dominance orientation endorse forming an independent Palestinian state and desire the Arab uprisings to succeed. Rejecting ideologies that legitimize outside interference with Arabs mediated this support. Measures and model results were robust across world regions. We discuss theoretical implications regarding the advent of new ideologies, and extending social dominance theory to address international relations.

Keywords: Political attitudes, counter-dominance, ideologies, social dominance orientation. Word Count text: 4,012; 40 References; Abstract: 149 words
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Arab nations are among the last to decolonize and develop (Jreisat, 2006; United Nations Development Programme, 2011). Their internal political situations range from repressive elite rule (e.g., Syria) to divisive democracies (e.g., Lebanon) to foreign-backed dictatorships (e.g., Saudi Arabia) to failed states beset with violence (e.g., Somalia). Economic opportunities and freedoms for Arab citizens are moderate at best; some have nearly none (Fund for Peace, 2011). Arab nations have among the highest rates in the world of interference from external actors, including foreign governments, international militaries, financial institutions, trade organizations, and non-governmental agencies (e.g., Fund for Peace, 2011). In short, the economic and security threats faced by most Arab peoples at the hands of their repressive or ineffective rulers are backed or tolerated by global powers (e.g., Richman, 1991; United Nations Development Programme, 2011).

Against this backdrop of multi-layered subordination, the contemporary Arab popular uprisings that captured world-wide attention, beginning with Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-immolation in Tunisia in December 2010, and the 2011 Palestinian request for recognition at the U.N. represent important steps in Arab ascendance (Lynch, 2012). Moreover, given the substantial external interference in Arab affairs (Fund for Peace, 2011), support or opposition of people outside Arab nations towards Arab autonomy may be crucial to the success of the movements (e.g., Passini & Morselli, 2012). Our research examined support for Arab ascendency among adults in 14 nations in the Balkans, the Middle East, Asia, Oceania, Europe, and the U.S.

Legitimizing Inequality and Oppression

Addressing the phenomena of (a) counter-dominant movements and (b) their international support or opposition requires extending theories of intergroup relations.
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One reason is that such theories usually consider only relations between two groups and usually *within* nations or between two nations. This does not address the intersection of international and intranational relations such as transnational support for counter-dominance movements. Another is that theories often focus on how *dominant* ideologies legitimize practices, rather than what *counter-*dominant ideologies accomplish. A third is that they focus on how *elites* persuade publics to tolerate or support such practices by promulgating dominant ideologies (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). For example, doctrines such as the domino theory and hegemonic stability theory have influenced U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East since World War II (e.g., Jreisat, 2006; Little, 2002, pp. 118-155, Lynch, 2012). Stereotypic images of nations influence political leaders’ policies towards other nations and public support of those policies (e.g., Alexander, Levin, & Henry, 2004; Hermann, 1985; Little, 2002, pp. 9-42). Scholars who advise U.S. Presidents have asserted that Arabs are incompetent at self-governance (e.g., Patai, 1973) and that Arab empowerment poses a threat to Israeli, U.S., and global security (e.g., Huntington, 1993; Lewis, 2002). These scholars’ views lend legitimacy to those of political, military, and media elites (e.g., DeAtkine, 2012; Friedman, 1989; Parker & Opal, 2012) and are disseminated in Western mass media (e.g., Little, 2002, pp. 9-42) such that sizable numbers of Western publics view Arabs as incompetent and as security threats (e.g., Tessler, 2003). This account does not explain how popular movements against dominance become more normative.

**Rejectionist Ideologies**

But many subordinated peoples have developed ideologies, such as liberalism, national liberation, Black Power, feminism, and anti-colonialism, that *reject* the legitimacy of subordination (e.g., Alquwaizani, 2011; Buhlan, 1985). The
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global spread of egalitarian values (e.g., Inglehart & Norris, 2004) may contribute to popularity of rejectionist ideologies because when people believe that greater equality is possible, they are more likely to reject intergroup inequality and the ideologies that legitimize dominance (e.g., Lee, Pratto, & Johnson, 2012). Just as dominant ideologies are widely accepted because they are consonant with certain publicized events or facts (e.g., Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), we argue that rejectionist ideologies may gain legitimacy when they are consonant with events or facts. Regarding Arab ascendancy, the fact that rather than ensuring Israeli and Western security, U.S. Middle Eastern policy is provoking rather than suppressing Arab and Muslim hostility to Israel and the West (e.g., Kohut, 2005; Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2011) has informed the rejectionist arguments of some political, military, and business elites (e.g., Carter, 2006; Petraeus, 2010; Robert, 2011). Also, the rise of China, Brazil, and other developing nations, and the initial successes of the Arab uprisings (removal of heads-of-state in Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen) may suggest that Arabs, like other people in the developing world, could govern themselves.

These global conditions of egalitarian aspirations and ideologically-dissonant facts catalyze acceptance of counter-dominant and rejectionist ideologies. Social dominance theory (SDT; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) predicts that supporters of such ideologies should endorse compatible policies. The psychological orientation to accept or reject intergroup domination in general (i.e., social dominance orientation; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994) underlies ideological support. SDT hypothesizes that relevant ideologies mediate the influence of SDO on attitudes towards policies that would sustain or change intergroup inequality (e.g., see Sidanius & Pratto, 1999, p. 105). Experimental evidence (e.g., Pratto, Tatar, & Conway-Lanz, 2000) as well as cross-sectional and longitudinal samples concerning national policies.
in many countries confirm this model and rule out alternative models (e.g., Pratto, Stallworth, & Conway-Lanz, 1999). For example, Pratto et al. (1999) showed that SDO measured in 1990 predicted U.S. Americans’ attitudes towards invading Iraq measured in 1991, mediated by conservative ideology and nationalism.

The present research extends previous findings by testing whether SDT’s model of policy support holds regarding rejectionist ideologies legitimizing not only domestic and foreign policy, but other nations’ outcomes (Study 1) and across global regions (Study 2). Specifically, we expected people lower on SDO to be more likely to reject the ideas that Arabs threaten world security and are incompetent, compared to people higher on SDO. Further, rejecting such ideologies mediate SDO’s influence on support for changes towards Arab empowerment that grew in 2011, namely, the popular Arab uprisings and Palestinian statehood.

**Study 1: Israeli Jews’ attitudes towards Palestinian-Israeli rights, Palestinian statehood, and the Arab uprisings**

Study 1 tested SDT’s model of policy legitimization in Israel regarding domestic policy (treatment of Palestinian Israeli citizens), foreign policy (formation of an independent Palestinian state), and outsiders’ policies (success of the Arab uprisings).

Because we surveyed adults in public, we used brief measures. In Israel, self-identification as a “Hawk” or a “Dove” connotes one’s ideological orientation about Israeli-Arab relations (Maoz & Eidelson, 2007), so we used this measure as a proxy for counter-dominant ideological support. Hawk/Dove ideology encompasses stereotypes, attributions of responsibility, assertions about rights, and beliefs about the appropriateness of intergroup actions and policies. A pilot survey of 161 Jewish Israeli adult train passengers illustrates parts of this ideology. Participants rated
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themselves from 1 (definitely dove) to 7 (definitely hawk). Controlling for
demographic variables, the more dovish participants were, the more trust they had in
Arabs, \( r = .58, p < .001 \), the less they believed Arabs are bad by nature, \( r = -.60, p < .001 \), the more empathic they were towards Arabs, \( r = .47, p < .001 \), and the more
they viewed Israel as responsible for the failure of the peace process, \( r = .55, p < .001 \).

Method

Participants and Procedure. Questions were translated into Hebrew and
back-translated into English. Participants were 121 Israeli Jews, aged 17 to 65 years,
surveyed on a train during August, 2011 (Arab participants were excluded from
analyses). Sample was diverse by gender (61 men, 60 women), ethnicity (50
Ashkenazim, 26 Mizrachi, 30 mixed, 14 other), age (half were 24 years or older), and
education level (elementary through graduate; 60% were beyond high school).

Measures. Intermixed with unrelated items, participants rated how much they
agreed or disagreed with promoting Arab autonomy: “Protecting the rights of Arabs
in Israel,” “Forming an independent Palestinian state,” and “I want the Arab uprisings
to succeed” from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Participants rated the
four SDO items \( (\alpha = .76, M = 4.22, SD = 1.88) \) shown in Table 1, from 1 (strongly
oppose) to 7 (strongly favor). The mediating ideological indicator was self-
identification from Dove (1) to Hawk (7), which we reverse-coded.

Results

Policy opinions were distributed across the entire range but on average,
participants were neutral about the rights of Arabs in Israel \( (M = 3.45, SD = 1.86) \),
slightly disagreed with an independent Palestinian state \( (M = 2.57, SD = 1.86) \), and
slightly agreed with Arab uprisings \( (M = 4.50, SD = 1.76) \).
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SDT predicts that people lower on SDO would support structural changes indicating Arab ascendancy, mediated by the Dove-Hawk indicator. The model, tested using MPlus 7.0 with maximum likelihood estimation, fit the data (see Figure 1). As predicted, lower SDO participants favored Arab rights within Israel, $r = .27$, a Palestinian state, $r = .29$, and the Arab uprisings, $r = .15$, $p < .05$. The standardized regression coefficients in Figure 1 show that these effects were mediated by the Dove-Hawk stance of participants. Adding direct paths from SDO to the policy measures did not improve model fit nor substantially reduce the paths from the Dove-Hawk mediator. Mediation was tested using the indirect effect test implemented in Mplus 7.0 bootstrapping with 100,000 runs. The tests were reliable; the indirect effect (IE) of SDO on support for rights of Palestinians within Israel was -.15, on a Palestinian state, -.18, and on success of the Arab uprisings, -.10, $p < .001$. The Dove-Hawk indicator fully mediated the effects of SDO on increased Arab ascendancy policies.

An alternative model reversing the positions of SDO and Dove-Hawk indicator showed that Dove-Hawk was the better mediator: all three direct paths from Dove-Hawk to policy outcomes were reliable, and all fit indicators were poor (e.g., RMSEA = .12).

Discussion

Considering Israeli policy might lead one to underestimate diversity within Israeli public opinion. However, results of Study 1 belie a stereotype of Israelis as monolithically opposed to Arab ascendance. Rather, Israelis’ attitudes varied and demonstrated the utility of the SDT model of policy support within Israel. Study 1 also extends the SDT model because policy opinions concerned not only domestic policies (rights of Arabs within Israel), a potential Israeli foreign policy (forming an independent Palestinian state), but political changes among neighbors (support for the
Support for Arab ascendance. These results show that our theoretical model can be extended to understand popular attitudes towards potential political changes in countries other than the participants’. Study 2 extended this model to rejectionist ideologies internationally.

**Study 2: Support for Arab ascendance around the world**

Study 2 surveyed adults in several world regions about their support for Arab ascendance. Participants completed ideology measures about Arabs regarding two common stereotype dimensions: untrustworthiness (dangerous) and competence (e.g., Zogby, 2010). Policy attitudes concerned two contemporary political movements: popular Arab uprisings and Palestinian statehood. Following SDT, we expected SDO to predict endorsement of rejectionist ideologies, which should mediate the influence of SDO on support for changes towards Arab autonomy.

**Method**

**Samples.** Study 2 was conducted in the last five months of 2011 and included participants from 13 countries in 7 regions. Four countries were in Middle-Northern Europe (Belgium, \( n = 113 \); Ireland, \( n = 60 \); U.K., \( n = 102 \); Switzerland, \( n = 50 \)), three in Southern Europe (Italy, \( n = 115 \); Spain, \( n = 112 \); Greece, \( n = 150 \)), two in the Balkans (Bosnia-Herzegovina, \( n = 60 \); Serbia, \( n = 60 \)), one in the Middle-East (Turkey, \( n = 124 \)), one in North America (U.S., \( n = 153 \)), one in Asia (China, \( n = 90 \)), and one in Oceania (New Zealand, \( n = 140 \)). Participants completed questions online (49%) or on paper; where method comparisons could be made, no differences were found (Morselli, 2012). Sampling was designed to encompass diversity of ages, genders, income levels, and political outlooks in each nation. Respondents’ ages ranged from 18 to 78 years; half were over 30. Fifty-four percent rated their economic situation as wealthy, better than most, or good compared to other people in their
countries, and 46% rated it so-so, poor, or destitute. Translations into 15 languages allowed every participant to complete questions in his or her mother tongue; translations were verified with back-translations (see Pratto, Cidam et al., 2013).

**Measures.**

**Support for Arab Ascendance.** Our outcome measures, which were treated separately, were “Forming an independent Palestinian state” and “I want the Arab uprisings to succeed.” All items were rated from 1 (strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree).

**Social Dominance Orientation.** The same 4-item measure of SDO as in Study 1 was used (see Pratto, Cidam et al., 2013 for translations, means and standard deviations for each country). These items constituted a latent variable with four indicators. Testing the theoretical multi-group latent model properly requires first confirming measurement invariance of the latent constructs (Reise, Widaman, & Pugh, 1993). To test that the four SDO items measured equivalently in all regions, measurement invariance was tested via multi-group confirmatory factor analysis. Measurement invariance is conventionally assessed in three ways (Reise et al., 1993). A model with factor loadings (for metric invariance) and intercepts (for scalar invariance) both constrained to be equal across regions, and including the same items (for configural invariance) was estimated via maximum likelihood with robust standard errors. Variables were centered on the grand mean. The fit indexes of the most constrained (scalar) model ($\chi^2 (50, N = 1233) = 54.08, ns; CFI = .99, RMSEA = .02$) were good; the latent construct of SDO conformed to configural, metric, and scalar invariance.

**Legitimizing Ideologies regarding Arab Ascendancy.** Our ideology items addressed the policy justifications based on stereotypes about Arabs made by Western
Support for Arab ascendance since the 1920s: “Outside control over Arabs is necessary for the world’s security,” and “The Arab people are competent enough to govern themselves.”

Results

On average people in all regions endorsed an independent Palestinian state, except for North Americans, who were neutral. Participants on average wanted the Arab uprisings to succeed in all regions except Asia, Oceania, and North America, where they slightly disagreed (see Table 2). On average, participants rejected the ideologies that Arabs should be externally controlled and are incompetent (see Table 2).

SDT predicts that participants should support the two Arab ascendancy policies to the extent they are low on SDO, and these negative relationships between SDO and policy support should be at least partially mediated by endorsement of the rejectionist ideologies. To test this conceptual model accounting for regional variance requires testing the direct and indirect influences of SDO in several steps.

The first step used a first structural equation model to test the direct path between SDO and the two policy variables. Model 1 was estimated with Mplus 7.0 via maximum likelihood with robust standard errors. The model was acceptable ($\chi^2 (95, N = 1242) = 147.30, p < .001; CFI = .93; RMSEA = .06$). As expected, the regression coefficients between SDO and the two dependent variables were negative in all regions (see Table 3). The magnitude of the coefficients was larger for support for the Palestinian state than for the Arab uprisings, except in Turkey. Support for the Palestinian state was inversely linked to SDO in all seven regions, although not significant in the New Zealand sample. Similarly, low SDO reliably predicted support
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for the Arab uprisings in 4 out of 7 regions, and were negative as expected in the New Zealand, China, and Balkan samples.

The second step tested whether pro-Arab autonomy ideology mediates the relationship between SDO and the two policies of Arab ascendancy. To do so, we had to model a latent factor specified by four indicators: the two legitimizing ideologies and our two policy dependent variables. The test of measurement invariance of this latent factor constrained factor loadings and intercepts to be equal across regions. This model fit the data well ($\chi^2 (41, N = 1242) = 54.96$, $ns$; $CFI = .96$; $RMSEA = .04$). Configural, metric, and scalar invariance confirmed the comparability of the latent construct across regions.

Step 3 inserted the latent construct of pro-Arab autonomy ideology into the previous model to test whether it mediated the effect of SDO on the two policy outcomes. As Model 2 ($\chi^2 (187, N = 1242) = 215.03$, $ns$; $CFI = .98$; $RMSEA = .03$) in Table 4 shows, in all regions except the Balkans, low SDO was reliably associated with endorsing the latent ideology. Ideology reliably predicted support for each policy, $ps < .001$. With two exceptions, direct paths from SDO to policy items were not reliable. On the whole, the SDT theoretical model was supported across regions.

To test whether the SDT model fit across regions, Model 3 constrained the paths from SDO to the latent ideology variable and from the latent ideology variable to each policy measure to be equal across regions, except for the Balkans. The constrained model fit the data ($\chi^2 (204, N = 1242) = 234.42$, $ns$; $CFI = .97$; $RMSEA = .03$), and the $\chi^2$ difference test ($\Delta\chi^2 (17) = 19.40$, $ns$) indicates that Model 3 was an improvement over the unconstrained Model 2. Standardized results for Model 3 in Figure 2 show that people low on SDO reject ideologies legitimizing Arab
subordination, and these ideologies in turn predict support for the Arab uprisings and for forming an independent Palestinian state.

Mediation was tested by calculating the indirect effects in Mplus 7.0 through bootstrapping 100,000 resamples. All indirect effects from SDO to policy outcomes were reliable (see Table 4), and direct paths from latent SDO to both outcome measures were unreliable (i.e., $p > .09$) when controlling for pro-Arab autonomy ideology. Hence, the rejectionist ideologies fully mediated the influence of SDO on both Arab ascendancy outcomes.

**Discussion**

The high level of external influence on Arab nations (e.g., Fund for Peace, 2011) makes the support or opposition to Arab ascendancy from non-Arabs a potentially important part of whether popular Arab demands for greater autonomy and equality will be realized. Study 2 showed strong support for the SDT model regarding two contemporary changes in potential Arab ascendancy: success of the popular uprisings and support for an independent Palestinian state. The results show robust support across regions for how rejectionist ideologies can legitimize change towards greater equality for subordinated regions. With the limits of what causal claims can be made from survey data, Study 2 constitutes robust international evidence that SDT can be extended to transnational intergroup relations. It also showed widespread rejection of Western ideologies that, as promoted by scholars and other elites, have served to legitimize subordination of Arabs (e.g., Little, 2002).

**General Discussion**

The world is alive with counter-dominance protests, from the students’ movements in Chile and Quebec, through the numerous counter-austerity demonstrations in Greece, Spain, the U.S. and elsewhere, to the ongoing Arab
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uprisings, and political changes in sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed, such protests and potential changes may be at their highest worldwide level since 1989. Although understanding how domination and oppression are sustained is an important subject of considerable research, resistance and opposition do occur and deserve equal theoretical attention (e.g., Haslam & Reicher, 2012; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Further, cross-national movements are increasingly influential (e.g., Passini & Morselli, 2012).

By extending SDT into the international realm and to Arab ascendency, the present research showed that people in many nations reject ideologies that suppress Arabs, especially participants low on SDO. This finding is important for three reasons. First, Arabs and other subordinated peoples may find allies among people who do not share their situations or identity. Broad values, not just identity politics (e.g., Haslam & Reicher, 2012), may be significant in international relations. Second, it suggests that rejectionist ideologies may become as widespread as dominant ideologies. How this happens warrants more research attention. Third, it demonstrates that elites are not necessarily in control of popular social and political rhetoric. As such, leaders may be informed by research such as the present studies about ordinary people’s political ideas (see also Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2011; Pratto, Sidanius, Bou Zeineddine, Kteily & Levin, in press; Zogby, 2010).

The present results highlight the need for theoretical and empirical attention to some new questions. Both studies showed an organized diversity of opinions among adult publics. Thus, understanding people’s attitudes only through national policies or averages of opinion polls can be misleading. Rather, it is important to understand psychology within national and international power contexts. For example, how does popular opinion influence elites’ acceptance of rejectionist ideologies? Are different
methods of collective organization more effective for people holding different political orientations? How can new rejectionist ideologies appeal to existing cultural ideas or narratives? Such questions position psychology at the intersection of cognition, motivation, social organization, and culture.

Like Study 1, Study 2 demonstrated that theories of prejudice, ideologies, and stereotype content that are commonly applied to intergroup relations within nations may be fruitfully applied to relations between nations. Given that Western stereotypes are well-known to Arabs (e.g., Zogby, 2010), it is all the more important to theorize and research how domestic intergroup relationships are nested in international relationships of power (e.g., see Pratto, et al., in press). Remarkably, Study 2 showed the same model fit across global regions. This shows the utility of the theoretical model, and that the rejectionist ideologies we studied here (that Arabs are competent and not a security threat) are widespread around the globe. That fact warrants further research attention. Most approaches to ideology assume that ideologies are cultural creations fitted to a particular socio-cultural and historical milieu (e.g., Sibley, 2010) or identity (e.g., Haslam & Reicher, 2012). To understand how ideologies come to be common across societies, we need to examine whether there are common socio-political conditions that interface with psychological processes to produce common ideological content independently (e.g., Levine & Campbell, 1972), and whether global communication and shared knowledge lead people to adopt rejectionist ideologies through inspiration from similar social movements (e.g., Alquwaizani, 2011).

Our research prompts two important modifications to SDT. Although SDT has always argued that both hierarchy-enhancing ideologies and hierarchy-attenuating ideologies are important, it holds that a balance between them sustains group-based
Support for Arab ascendance dominance (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999, p. 51). Essentially, hierarchy-attenuating ideologies temper the degree of oppression to tolerable levels and thereby legitimize it. But popular movements and rejectionist ideologies appear to produce new facts and new normative values that in turn provoke change against the tolerance of group-based dominance and obviation of the relevant social categories of dominance. SDT needs to address more complex power relationships than intrasocietal domination (see also Pratto et al., in press) and the spread of ideologies across cultures.

Another important question is how rejectionist ideologies might inspire true alternative ideologies, that is, frames that not only negate dominant ideologies, but function in their stead. Psychological research will have to consider that people find it difficult to reject ideas as false without considerable effort (e.g., Gilbert, 1991). If rejectionist ideologies refer to dominant ideologies, then activating rejectionist ideologies may cognitively reinforce the dominant ideologies they negate and weaken the potential of rejectionist ideologies. How people change their worldviews pertain to intergenerational and intercultural socialization, international relations, as well as cognitive processes. As the present research demonstrates, such issues should not be left only to anthropologists, historians, political scientists, and sociologists, many of whom focus on the relation of power and ideology, but are an important theoretical and practical arena for psychological research. The present research contributes to other nascent psychological work on ideology (e.g., Sibley, 2010) in begging for new theorizing and more research. Most especially, studies of whether new alternative ideologies help to create new socio-political arrangements will be informative.

More broadly, there is no reason to neglect the psychology of people in subordinated situations. Basic psychological processes including reactance, cognitive consistency, self-esteem striving, and collective autonomy-striving appear likely to
contribute to individual and collective processes that counter dominance. As SDT theorizes and as we showed in the introduction, scholars can help legitimize dominance processes. Without research attention on the psychologies of resistance movements, the way they change ideologies, and how social networks and communication processes may spread and modify people’s ideologies, aspirations, and goals, psychological researchers may overestimate the stability of hierarchical social systems and contribute to their perpetuation (Rommi, 2012). Scientific research on the questions outlined here may help correct this imbalance.
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Table 1

Items from the Short Social Dominance Orientation Scale in two of the languages used.

**English (Study 2, U.S., Ireland, New Zealand, U.K.)**

In setting priorities, we must consider all groups. (R)

We should not push for equality between groups.

Group equality should be our ideal. (R)

Superior groups should dominate inferior groups.

**Hebrew (Study 1, Israel)**

1. כשקובעים סדרות,علנה דלשת על כל הקבוצות
2. לא מצפים מהשוויון לכל הקבוצות.
3. שוויון לקבוצתозвאת האידיאל
4. קבוצות עליונות זרזויות שלמות על קבוצות שיוור מוכרים.

**Note.** (R) indicates item is reverse-coded, shown only for English language. In Figures 1 and 3, the SDO items correspond to those shown here. The scale in additional languages is available from the first author and in Pratto, Cidam et al. (2013).
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Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations of policy support, ideological items, and SDO by world region, Study 2.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Arab Uprisings M(SD)</th>
<th>Palestinian State M(SD)</th>
<th>Arabs are Competent M (SD)</th>
<th>Control over Arabs M (SD)</th>
<th>SDO M(SD)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Northern Europe</td>
<td>6.96 (2.84)</td>
<td>6.83 (2.60)</td>
<td>7.21 (2.55)</td>
<td>4.10 (2.70)</td>
<td>3.11 (1.62)</td>
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<td>Southeast Europe</td>
<td>6.54 (2.59)</td>
<td>7.13 (2.72)</td>
<td>6.59 (2.86)</td>
<td>3.69 (2.69)</td>
<td>2.80 (1.44)</td>
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<td>Balkans</td>
<td>4.94 (3.27)</td>
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<td>4.70 (3.38)</td>
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<td>6.55 (3.24)</td>
<td>7.38 (2.93)</td>
<td>7.51 (2.96)</td>
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<td>4.79 (2.98)</td>
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<td>4.97 (2.58)</td>
<td>6.10 (2.17)</td>
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*Note. Participants rated policies from 1 (strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree).*
Table 3. Standardized Regression Coefficients of Model 1 by Region, Study 2.

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<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Arab Uprisings</th>
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<td>-.18**</td>
<td>-.25***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balkans</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>-.49***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>-.34**</td>
<td>-.26**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>-.33***</td>
<td>-.27**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>-.24*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>-.17</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Model 1 regressed support for the two policy items on SDO simultaneously in each region. Standardized effects are shown. *** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$. 
Table 4. Standardized Direct and Indirect Effects of Model 2 by Region, Study 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Ideology on SDO</th>
<th>Arab Uprisings on Ideology</th>
<th>Palestinian State on Ideology</th>
<th>Arab Uprisings on SDO</th>
<th>Palestinian State on SDO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northern Europe</td>
<td>-.27**</td>
<td>.68***</td>
<td>.56***</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-26***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Europe</td>
<td>-.52***</td>
<td>.71***</td>
<td>.51***</td>
<td>.23*</td>
<td>-24***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balkans</td>
<td>-.17</td>
<td>.48***</td>
<td>.37***</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-24***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>-.43*</td>
<td>.58***</td>
<td>.46***</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>-22***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>-.53**</td>
<td>.65***</td>
<td>.54***</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-31***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>-.64***</td>
<td>.39***</td>
<td>.40***</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>-20***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>-.30*</td>
<td>.58***</td>
<td>.55***</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>-21***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. In Model 2, the latent ideology variable was regressed on SDO, and each policy item was regressed on the latent ideology variable. To test for mediation of the ideology variable, we added the direct effects from SDO to the policy items. Standardized effects are shown. *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05. β = direct effect. IE = indirect effect. Indirect effects were estimated by bootstrapping 100,000 runs using the delta method.
Support for Arab ascendance

Figure 1. Structural equation model of Israeli Jews’ support for Arab ascendancy (Study 1). Theoretical model is bolded.

Note. $X^2 (19, N = 121) = 25.35$, ns; CFI = .97; RMSEA = .05; Standardized estimates are shown: *** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$. Errors between Protecting the rights of Arabs in Israel and Forming a Palestinian state correlated .34.
Support for Arab ascendance

Figure 2. Multi-regional structural equation model of support for Arab ascendancy (Study 2). Theoretical model is bolded.

Note: Fit of constrained model: $\chi^2 (204, N = 1242) = 234.42, ns; CFI = .97; RMSEA = .03$. Standardized estimates are shown ; *** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$. Direct paths from SDO to policy items are reported in square brackets.