Ethnocentrism and Sexism: How Stereotypes Legitimize Six Types of Power
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Abstract
We review evidence of inequality associated with gender and social categories like
ethnicity with respect to six types of power: control of resources, force, legitimacy,
obligations, knowledge, and sexuality. Presuming that stereotypes are one means of
legitimizing power differentials between groups, we review research on stereotype
contents for both ethnicity and gender with respect to the six forms of power. The
review reveals a number of rhetorical means by which stereotypes legitimize ethnic
dominants and men having particular forms of power, such as disguising the exercise
of power by describing it in individualistic rather than relational terms, and also how
stereotypes de-legitimize women and ethnic subordinates from obtaining particular
forms of power, such as by stating that what they desire and their virtues preclude
exercising power. A new research agenda regarding stereotypes and how they legiti-
mize group power differences is outlined.

Social inequality is linked to two general kinds of social groups: gender and
‘arbitrary’ group designations such as race, ethnicity, nationality, social class,
caste, region, or religion (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Although social dominance
theory calls the latter kind of group power differentiation the ‘arbitrary set’
distinction, it is more commonly called ethnicity. We refer to the more pow-
erful arbitrary set/ethnic’ group as ‘dominants’ and the less powerful one as
‘subordinates’.

Social psychological research has identified several processes that harm both
members of denigrated ethnic groups and women, including stereotype threat
(Spencer, Steele, & Quinn, 1999; Steele & Aronson, 1995), hiring discrim-
inination (e.g., Pratto & Espinoza, 2001), and shifting standards for evaluation
(e.g., Biernat & Kobrynowicz, 1997). Stereotypes are a nexus for intergroup
power relations because they both reflect (e.g., Ryan, 2002) and re-create
structural relations (e.g., Jussim, Palumbo, Chatman, Madon, & Smith, 2000).
Stereotypes structure unequal ethnic and gender relations by prescribing
behavior of group members (e.g., Prentice & Carranza, 2002), influencing the
allocation of social roles (e.g., Pratto, Stallworth, Sidanius, & Siers, 1997), and
fomenting particular kinds of prejudice and discrimination (e.g., Cuddy,
Fiske, & Glick, 2007). Theoretically, stereotypes not only structure and reflect,
but legitimate group power differences (e.g., Jost & Banaji, 1994; Pratto, 1999). There is relatively little evidence, however, of how stereotypes lend legitimacy to power inequality (for an exception, see Jost, Kivetz, Rubini, Guermandi, & Mosso, 2005). This paper summarizes evidence for power differences associated with ethnicity and gender, and then reviews stereotype contents in light of group power differences. Our review ends with a new research agenda for examining rhetorical means by which stereotypes legitimize group power differences.

Definitions of Power

To describe ethnic and gender power relations, we consider what it means for one group to have more power than another. We then delineate how ethnocentrism and sexism pertain to several types of power that the Power Basis Theory (Pratto, Lee, Tan, & Pitpitan, forthcoming) specifies recur in human relations.

Power can be defined in several ways (see Fiske & Berdahl, 2007). Many social psychologists view power as interpersonal influence (e.g., French & Raven, 1959; Raven, 1992). Theorists employing interdependence theory (Thibaut & Kelly, 1959) view power as control over another person’s outcomes (e.g., Fiske, 1993; Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, & Gruenfeld, 2006). Like Lewin’s (1951) conception of power as contextually constrained choice, others view high-power positions as providing greater freedom (Guinote, Judd, & Brauer, 2002; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003).

In contrast, the Power Basis Theory (Pratto et al., forthcoming) takes an ecological perspective and views power as the means of meeting survival requirements. Thus, the Power Basis Theory defines constructive power as the ability to meet survival requirements, and destructive power as the ability to create need deficits or prevent survival needs from being met. By viewing power with reference to needs, the Power Basis Theory allows that one group may have more power than another by having more ability to meet its members’ needs, whether or not the more powerful group exerts direct influence or outcome control over the less powerful group (Henry & Pratto, forthcoming). In other words, in the Power Basis Theory, power is to meet needs, and a party can have more power than another party, whether or not power is over the other party. This focus on needs prioritizes considering how power benefits and harms.

Power struggles arise because humans have the same survival needs, and draw upon the same ecology to meet those needs. This is why individuals and groups tend to contest power in particular domains: each survival need has a concomitant type of power. Considering the fundamental needs for wholeness or health, consuming resources, belonging, care from others, competence at interacting with one’s environment, and reproduction, the Power Basis Theory posits that six recurrent types of power structure intergroup relationships: physical force (e.g., violence), control of material resources,
legitimacy, asymmetric obligations, knowledge, and sexuality. Power Basis Theory can be used to describe power dynamics among individuals and between governing elites (Pratto, Pearson, Lee, & Saguy, in press). Here, we use it to describe ethnic and gender relationships with respect to each type of power.

**Types of Power and Their Relation to Ethnicity and Gender**

*Control of resources*

Control of valued material resources and control over processes that make resources valuable (e.g., manufacturing) structures ethnic hierarchies (e.g., Blalock, 1982) and gender hierarchies (e.g., Sacks, 1974). Within nations, ethnic dominants have restricted land ownership, land use, and fishing rights to themselves. Between nations, dominant nations have restricted shipping lanes and much of the world’s natural resources to their own nations.

If ethnic subordinates are used to extract value from resources controlled by ethnic dominants, the two groups may be interdependent. For example, agricultural labor and mining may be necessary to realize economic benefits of land. Dominants’ dependence on subordinates’ labor does not necessarily increase subordinates’ relative power or freedom. Instead, dominants often use physical coercion, the law, and economic dependency to extract subordinates’ labor for their own profit, as in feudalism, itinerant farming, plantation slavery, sweat shops, company towns, and kidnapping immigrant laborers. World-wide, subordinates are prevented from working in desirable occupations, paid less than others for the same work, and get stagnated in low-paid undesirable jobs (International Labour Organization, 2007).

Similarly, women rarely obtain the most attractive occupations and are paid less than men for doing the same work (e.g., International Labour Organization, 2007). Women’s control of resources can help rebalance gender inequality. For example, in some matrilineal societies, women own the land and have greater power within families as a result (Arnfred, 2007; Hamamsy, 1957). Women’s suffrage passed first in the western states (of the United States) where land ownership had been opened to women to increase migration (Matsuda, 1985). In societies where women control food, an essential resource, women have more power than in societies in which women have no special domain of resource control (Arnfred, 2007; Brown, 1970). However, in societies with surplus wealth, control over food is not as critical for maintaining power, so gender inequality and ethnic inequality increase (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999, Ch. 2).

*Physical force*

Force can bring harm to the victim or constrain the victim’s ability to meet own needs. Therefore, being victimized by force reduces power. Using force
represents an attempt to gain power, which may be successful if it brings benefits, but may fail when met with retribution or sanctions. Recognizing these dimensions, plus the facts that force can be used in personal or impersonal relationships and can be organized or spontaneous and official or unofficial, helps make sense of force in relation to ethnicity and gender and their intersection.

Organized forceful conflict only occurs between arbitrary set groups like nations or factions, not between coalitions of genders or between adults and children (e.g., Keegan, 1993). For official ‘war’ and unofficial ‘terrorism’, nearly all commanders and combatants are men, although children are being conscripted in certain conflicts (e.g., Azourmanian & Pizzutelli, 2003) and women have volunteered as terrorists (Bloom, 2005). Humanitarian law specifies that combatants must be the official targets, but as 20th century wars killed more non-combatants than combatants (World Health Organization, 2002), war should be understood as harming men, women, and children. Sub-state terrorists have targeted official empty buildings (e.g., ANC activities), official leaders (e.g., Rajiv Ghandi) and entire ethnic groups, but terrorism typically targets more powerful groups (Pape, 2006; Schmid & Longman, 1988). With that exception, ethnic violence especially harms ethnic subordinates.

The perpetrators and victims of official and unofficial force are strongly associated with gender. Officials commissioned to use institutional force such as lawyers, judiciaries, police, and members of militaries are nearly all men (Pratto & Walker, 2004). Men are far more likely than women to die of on-the-job injuries (Pratto & Walker, 2004). Unofficial interpersonal violence such as assault and murder are mainly perpetrated by men against men and by adolescent boys against adolescent boys (e.g., Archer, 2000; Daly & Wilson, 1988; Pinhiero, 2006). Rape is almost always committed by men against women, although girls, boys, and men are also raped. When exercised in war, rape is intended to humiliate and demoralize all the enemies (United Nations, 2002). Partner abuse is also predominantly committed by men against women (World Health Organization, 2002). Child abuse, especially neglect of young children and emotional abuse, is somewhat more commonly committed by mothers than by fathers (Trocmé et al., 2005; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2007). Infanticide and sex-selective abortion overwhelmingly are performed on female babies and fetuses by their mothers or other female relatives (e.g., Caldwell & Caldwell, 2005; Gauthier, Chaudoir, & Forsyth, 2003). Gendered violence, then, is perpetrated in a hierarchical pattern from men harming men and then women and boys, boys harming boys, to women harming children and babies.

Other forms of force correspond to the intersection of gender and ethnicity. Official force is performed by judicial systems, which overwhelmingly protect ethnic dominants and punish ethnic subordinates, especially young men (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999, Chapter 8). Capital punishment executes men nearly exclusively and in disproportion to their commission of capital
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Child abuse is disproportionately directed against children who are ethnic subordinates within their societies, and by women who are the victims’ mothers or employers (Pinhiero, 2006). Prosecution of child abuse and infanticide is uncommon as they are rarely documented (Caldwell & Caldwell, 2005; Pinhiero, 2006).

Legitimacy

According to Zelditch (2001, p. 33), ‘something is legitimate if it is in accord with the norms, values, beliefs, practices, and procedures accepted by a group.’ Therefore, a person is legitimate if the person is accepted in a community. Those lacking legitimacy may be stigmatized, have suspect identities, or be actively or implicitly excluded. Status eases acceptance: Legitimate people are usually more prestigious, more likely to be authorities, have more say in community matters, and have more attention given to their experiences and perspectives than people without legitimacy.

Dominant ethnic groups and their members typically have more authority (e.g., Zegers de Beijl, 1990), prestige (e.g., Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; Jost et al., 2005), and presumed normality (Pratto, Hegarty, & Korchmaros, 2007) than subordinate ethnic groups do. In contrast, the points of view and experiences of subordinates are more suspect and peculiarized (e.g., Littlefield, 2008). Similarly, being male is presumed to be more normal than being female (Bem, 1993; Eagly & Kite, 1987; Miller, Taylor, & Buck, 1991). Many more authorities are men than women (see Pratto & Walker, 2004, pp. 254–255). Moreover, men predominate in the ‘public’ sphere in which transferable status can be conferred, rather than the ‘private’ (family) sphere to which ‘respectable’ women are often consigned (Rosaldo, 1974).

Knowledge

Knowledge of how to be, such as what goals, beliefs, and experiences are valid or ‘civilized’ is often defined ethnocentrically by dominants (e.g., Sumner, 1906) and androcentrically (e.g., Bem, 1993). Access to formal knowledge through education depends largely on ethnic status (e.g., Sidanius & Pratto, 1999, pp. 178–180). Many factors produce this outcome, including discrimination in public education funding, social-psychological difficulties produced by ethnic prejudice and stereotypes, and differential tracking. There are also substantial gender disparities in adult literacy and education in more than half the world’s nations (U.N., 2007a). Among elementary pupils, this disparity is decreasing (U.N., 2007b).

Obligations to others

Asymmetric obligations, wherein one party is more obliged than the other through customs, roles, and social or economic constraints, are a form of
unequal power (Pratto & Walker, 2004). Interethnic relations are highly variable regarding asymmetric obligations. Feudalism, plantation slavery, and colonization are instances in which subordinates are more obliged to dominants than the reverse. Sometimes, groups openly compete for resources and jobs (e.g., Bobo & Hutchings, 1996), and sometimes, groups are isolated enough to be neither competitive nor obliged (e.g., Bonacich, 1972). In contrast, gender relationships are nearly always characterized by greater obligation for women than men because of marriage customs and family roles (e.g., Human Rights Watch, 2006). Freedom for women to be celibate, unmarried (McNamara, 1996), and to divorce, especially where child care is not viewed mainly as women’s responsibility, reduces gender inequality (Leacock, 1981).

**Sexuality**

Sexual experiences can be given and enjoyed symmetrically and sexuality is associated with pleasurable desires. For these reasons, sexuality may seem outside the domain of control, power, or creating needs in others. However, as sexual behavior is social, it can be subject to group-based power and can create psychological, biological, and social harms.

Dominants have used legal or pseudo-legal force to constrain others’ sexual practices or not to recognize them as valid. For example, colonial Virginia made marriage for bonded people, and therefore their sexual liaisons, illegal (Allen, 1997, p. 153). The marriages of African-American slaves were not legally recognized until after emancipation (Gutman, 1976). Although polygamy was traditional in Judaism, Mormonism, and Islam, Western nations have made it illegal. Homosexuality is subject to considerable sanctions, both official and unofficial (e.g., Ronner, 2005).

Sexuality disadvantages women in many ways. Intercourse is riskier for women than men in terms of disease (e.g., Arol & Guinan, 1984; Padian, Shiboski, & Jewell, 1991) and child care burdens (International Labour Office, 2004). In some societies, women have less choice than men over whether to engage in sexual relationships because of marriage and rape laws (Human Rights Watch, 2006). Women who lack other forms of power (e.g., knowledge, gainful employment) may be exploited so that others gain access to their sexuality. American women stay in abusive relationships when they lack transportation or a job that would enable independence (Rusbult & Martz, 1995), and women in many volatile and impoverished nations are forced into sex work (Ehrenreich & Hochschild, 2003; Farr, 2005).

Power in sexual relationships is strongly associated with the intersection of gender and ethnicity. In the United States, dominant men raped enslaved women without punishment, and because of the largesse dominant men were able to offer, subordinate women sometimes agreed to sexual relations with dominant men (e.g., Fredrickson, 1981; White, 1985). At present, men from developed nations are the most frequent perpetrators of prostitution with
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girls from poor families in the third world (e.g., Nair, 2007). Similarly, girls in subordinate ethnic groups in poor nations are most often tricked into sexual enslavement, although boys in subordinate groups are the primary victims in some locales (United Nations Children’s Fund, 2001).

**Power and Stereotypes**

Our review has established that ethnic and gender inequalities are instantiated in at least six forms of power. Drawing on research on stereotypes, stigma, and ideologies, we posit that stereotypes legitimize group power inequality in four general ways we label matching, deservingness, beneficence, and disguise.

First, stereotypic characteristics may seem to match a group’s roles or power positions. This person-perception or attribution approach follows from social role theory (e.g., Conway, Pizzimiglio, & Mount, 1996; Eagly & Steffen, 1984), attribution approaches to stereotyping (Fiske et al., 2002), and self-fulfilling prophecies (Jussim et al., 2000), and leads to the hypotheses that (a) **Stereotypes can make power-use and power-holding by dominant groups seem appropriate or natural.** Conversely, (b) **stereotypes can make power-use and power-holding by subordinate groups seem inappropriate or unnatural.**

Second, stereotypes are interpreted through ideologies about deservingness such that stereotypic characteristics make power distribution seem *deserved* (Pratto, 1999). For example, being overweight violates the Protestant work ethic, so that obese people seem undeserving (Crandall, 1994). The cognitive demand of maintaining balance may lead people to presume that if a group has good outcomes, the group must be ‘good’ and conversely for ‘bad’ people and bad outcomes (Crandall & Beasley, 2001). This reasoning implies that (c) **Stereotypes can make power distributions, including more power for some than for others, seem deserved.** Similarly, stereotypes can be interpreted through world-views about causation, such that (d) **stereotypes can make power distributions seem inevitable** (e.g., Diekman et al., 2005).

Third, as suggested by the Power Basis Theory (Pratto et al., forthcoming) and analyses of paternalism (Jackman, 1994; Glick & Fiske, 1996; Pratto & Walker, 2000), stereotypes can make power inequality appear beneficent and make egalitarian changes to power structures appear harmful. This could occur through several rhetorical means. (e) **Stereotypes can conflate what is beneficial or harmful for more powerful groups into what is beneficial or harmful to less powerful groups or all.** (f) **Stereotypes can indicate which groups’ well-being should be prioritized or discounted.** (g) **Stereotypes can make power in the hands of women and subordinates and children seem especially harmful or dangerous.**

Fourth, as suggested by critical theory (e.g., Tavris & Wade, 1984) and false consciousness (Jost & Banaji, 1994), stereotypes can provide a misleading portrayal of power distributions in several ways. **Stereotypes can (h) label dominants’ traits in ways that draw attention away from their power, (i) disguise power and inequality so as not to call the legitimacy of power differences into question, and (j)**
exaggerate the amount of power that women, children, and subordinates have. We now examine stereotype contents to see how they may legitimize power.

**How Stereotypes De-legitimize Power Holding by Subordinates and Women**

*Stereotypes and resource control*

Some resource stereotypes use matching: African Americans and Mexican Americans are stereotyped as poor (Devine & Elliot, 1995; Marin, 1984; Mindiola, Rodriguez, & Niemann, 1996). Other stereotypes question the deservingness of women’s and subordinate’s access to resources. For instance, women are stereotyped as loving to shop but not work, and as ‘gold-diggers’ who seek wealthy husbands. Stereotypes about Blacks and Chicanos suggest that they obtain resources through illegal and immoral ways such as criminality (Devine & Elliot, 1995; Niemann, 2001; Niemann et al., 1994).

*Stereotypes and force*

Group force stereotypes speak to beneficence in ways that not only de-legitimize allegedly dangerous groups, but also excuse violence among dominant men. Whites stereotype Blacks as aggressive (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1982), and Black men as violent, dangerous (Staples, 1992), and criminal (e.g., Eberhardt, Goff, Purdie, & Davies, 2004). The stereotype of the hostile, aggressive Black woman is exemplified by the ‘Sapphire’ character, an assertive Black woman who nags incessantly (West, 2004). This image was represented during the 1940s and 1950s in the *Amos ‘n’ Andy* shows and is now reincarnated as the threatening ‘gangsta girl’ (Stephens & Phillips, 2003). The choice of describing women who could instead be said to be strong, self-reliant, and goal-directed, as aggressive and manipulative (Bell, 2004) shows that rhetorical goals concerning power legitimization may influence stereotypes as much as structural realities do. The stereotype that White women are weak rationalizes White sexism as ‘protection,’ (Glick & Fiske, 1996) and rationalizes violence against Black men (Davis, 1981).

*Stereotypes and legitimacy*

Stereotypes, images, and epithets of women, poor people, and subordinates question their deservingness. For instance, women ‘put on airs’, and Blacks are ‘uppity’ (Freed, 1992). Similarly, a component of symbolic racism is that Blacks have gone too far in pushing for equality (Henry & Sears, 2002). Ethnic slurs such as *kike*, *greaseball*, and *nigger* diminish deservingness by invoking very negative valence (Mullen, Rozell, & Johnson, 2001). Trait words ethnic groups use to describe each other connote more positive valence for more powerful groups (e.g., spontaneous) than for other groups (e.g.,
impulsive; Peabody, 1968). Devious means of obtaining power makes power seem undeserved, as when people say that women are ‘manipulative’, Asians are ‘inscrutable’, or Jews are ‘scheming’. Also, because ‘legitimate’ groups have more ‘voice’ or ‘say’, stereotypes of African Americans as loud and nagging (Leonard & Locke, 1993; Niemann et al., 1994; West, 2004) suggest that hearing their perspectives is odious. Matching is also at work regarding legitimacy. Stereotypes women as emotional and irrational (Plant, Hyde, Keltner, & Devine, 2000; Shields, 2002; Williams & Best, 1990) make authority positions seem inappropriate for women.

**Stereotypes and knowledge**

Many knowledge stereotypes operate on matching. Whites and others view Blacks as stupid (Devine & Elliot, 1995; Dovidio & Gaertner, 1982; Gilbert, 1951; Katz & Braly, 1933; Steele & Aronson, 1995). Chicanos/as are stereotyped as ignorant and unintelligent (Carranza, 1993; Cross & Maldonado, 1971; Fairchild & Cozens, 1981; Niemann, 2001). Women are not seen as logical, analytical, mathematical, or rational (e.g., Diekman, Eagly, Mladinic, & Ferreira, 2005; Eccles, Jacobs, & Harold, 1990; Jacobs & Eccles, 1985; Swim, 1994; Spencer, Steele, & Quinn, 1999) or expected to be as smart as men (Prentice & Carranza, 2002). In the United States, Asians are stereotyped as mathematical and intelligent (e.g., Shih, Pittinsky, & Ambady, 1999). This may contribute to their being disliked (e.g., Cuddy et al., 2007).

**Stereotypes and obligations to others**

Stereotypic images of ethnic subordinates prescribe obligatory relationships for them. The Black ‘Mammy’, invented after the Civil War, is still present as Big Mama in contemporary advertising (Crawford, 2006, p. 71). Her strength, nurturance, and asexuality indicate her readiness to take on multiple roles of mother, wife, and caregiver to the entire families (West, 2004). The Post-Bellum servile caricatures of Black men like Step-N-Fetch-It and Uncle Tom are reincarnated in contemporary films and television shows in which a subordinate is muse and helper to the primary White characters (e.g., The Karate Kid, The Legend of Bagger Vance, Star Trek). Stereotypes of Chicanos/as as loyal and family-oriented (e.g., Carranza, 1993), and of Chicanas as ‘baby-makers’ (Niemann et al., 1994) prescribes obligations for this ethnic group.

Women, especially subordinate women, are made to seem obliged to others by ‘naturalizing’ these obligations as part of their ‘characters’. By stating that women desire to perform obligations such as child care and housekeeping, their lack of choice in such relationships is hidden. Furthermore, women’s stereotypic loyalty, interest in children, and warmth (Bem, 1974; Prentice & Carranza, 2002) are virtues that make women ‘above’ wielding power (Glick & Fiske, 1996). Hence, such stereotypes not only use matching but deservingness and disguise.
Stereotypes and sexuality

Bizarre sexual stereotypes of subordinates are promulgated in dominants’ prejudice. For example, some American White Supremicists believe that Jews are the offspring of a sexual union between Eve and Satan, and their prejudices are fed by concerns with homosexuality and Black sexuality (Arena & Arrigo, 2000). English and American Whites stereotyped Blacks in Africa and the Americas as sexually licentious (e.g., Fredrickson, 1988). The stereotypic insatiable desires of Black men for White women has been used to rationalize lynching, opposition to racial equality and school desegregation (e.g., Turner, Singleton, & Musick, 1984).

Western societal norms prescribe that men should initiate sex, and that women should remain submissive in these attempts (e.g., McCreary & Rhodes, 2001; Muehlenhard & McCoy, 1991). This double-standard seems to produce inconsistent sexual stereotypes of women. The pure and chaste ‘Madonna’ must deny her own sexuality, but the ‘slut’ or ‘whore’ commonly depicted in pornography wants nothing but sex, as if she were a projection of men’s desires. Women’s allegedly powerful desire for sex makes it impossible to claim that women can be raped against their will (Burt, 1980; Reid & Bing, 2000). Similarly, the asexual Mammy image contrasts with the image of Jezebel, the Black sexual temptress who corrupts virtuous men with her powerful desirability (White, 1985). ‘Jezebels’ feature prominently in hip-hop music videos, where they are referred to as ‘hoochies’ or ‘freaks’ (West, 2004). Combined, asexual and hypersexual images of women make it impossible for a woman to uphold both prescriptions (Tavris & Wade, 1984). Chaste stereotypes necessitate male sexual aggression, whereas temptress images imply that women rather than men control heterosexual behavior. Such sexual stereotypes make women undeserving while disguising the real power and harm in objectification and rape.

The Western media also eroticize Asian women, who are portrayed as subservient, passive, sexy, available sexual objects (Chan, 2004). The well-known images of the erotic geisha and ‘Suzie Wong’ types intertwine women’s sexuality with prescribed service and obligations to power-holding dominant men (Chan, 1997; Oyserman & Sakamoto, 1997). One advertisement for the sex trade in the Philippines stated, ‘They let you do them any way you want, any hole is up for grabs, when you wake up after all that, your clothes are washed, and there are fresh mangoes for breakfast’ (Enrile, 2007). These sexual stereotypes disguise power by portraying men’s desires as women’s and their dehumanization of women implies that women’s well-being need not be considered.

How Stereotypes Legitimize Power Holding by Men and Ethnic Dominants

Men and ethnic dominants are not stereotyped as often as women and ethnic subordinates, respectively (Fiske, 1998), in large part because they are presumed
to constitute the norm that goes unexamined rather than explained by stereotypes (Hegarty & Pratto, 2001; Pratto et al., 2007). Hence, for example, it is common to hear that women and minorities are ‘disadvantaged’, but not that men and ethnic dominants are ‘privileged’ (e.g., Powell, Branscombe, & Schmitt, 2005). If, as we hypothesize here, stereotypes reify group power inequalities, then stereotypes of dominants and men should make their greater power seem appropriate or deserved, draw attention away from their power, or imply that their power is beneficial to others.

Ethnocentrism is implicitly privileged rather than overtly acknowledged. Ethnic control of resources is often, though not always, described in admirable terms such as ‘ambitious’ rather than ‘controlling’ or ‘greedy’. Likewise, violence by dominants against civilians is not called ‘terrorism’ as often as violence by subordinates is. Ethnic legitimacy often comes from conflating the mores of the dominant group with that of ‘civilization’. A primary way that power by dominants is legitimized is by construing it as beneficent (Jackman, 1994). For example, the ideology of ‘White man’s burden’ (Whites had an obligation to civilize and govern Others) worked hand-in-hand with stereotypes of the colonized as savage and primitive (e.g., Fredrickson, 1981). Similarly, intelligence is far more often defined as what ethnic dominants know than what ethnic subordinates know. Ethnic dominants’ sexual behavior is often undescribed as ‘private’, such that, unlike the sexuality of ethnic subordinates, it falls prey neither to accusations of asexuality or hypersexuality. In large part, stereotypes do not bring the power advantages of dominant groups to mind or label them as power, but when power is overt, it is construed as beneficent.

Similarly, men are expected to be leaders, self-reliant, ambitious, assertive, and decisive, or in a word, agentic (e.g., Eagly & Wood, 1982; Prentice & Carranza, 2002; Ruble & Ruble, 1982). Because many people see agency and communality as mutually exclusive (Conway et al., 1996), the agentic stereotype makes men exempt from obligations to others. The agentic stereotype also makes it seem appropriate for men to have authority positions, which imply both the legitimacy to set agendas and to control resource allocation. Note also that the agentic stereotype focuses attention on the properties of the man and not on his power relationships to others. Hence, matching, deservingness, and beneficence are at work regarding stereotypes of men.

The missing acknowledgement of relational power also plays out regarding stereotypes of men and force. Although men are expected to be aggressive and forceful (Prentice & Carranza, 2002), these prescriptive stereotypes do not make White men seem dangerous to others (e.g., St. John & Heald-Moore, 1995, 1996). As noted above, stereotypes of women’s sexuality imply that men do not willingly control women, but have an obligation to do so. Men are not only stereotyped as more intelligent than women, but genius is often defined only for domains in which men predominate (e.g., science, arts).
Discussion

We first introduced a new way of conceptualizing power. Rather than viewing group differences in power in terms of asymmetric social influence or asymmetric outcome control, we defined power in regard to survival needs. This theoretical focus makes clear why both benefits and harms are associated with power. Unlike approaches to social structure that focus on status, which is always relative, and approaches to power that are solely relational, Power Basis Theory provides an objective standard for gauging group power: in the group’s well-being, rather than how it compares to others. This may help prevent the use of ethnocentric and androcentric standards of whether power is beneficent or just, and whose power is agentic and causal.

Moreover, the types of power examined here lay the ground for making sense of why there are different ways of being powerful and dominating others, from controlling resources to forceful coercion to engineering. Our delineation of important types of power considerably extends theoretical analyses of social structure beyond social status, which we would argue, mainly addresses legitimacy as a form of power, and social roles, which organize social life but do not explain behavior. Further research documenting how these forms of power are used relationally is needed to describe group power dynamics, such as how a group might turn surplus resources into force or legitimacy.

These six forms of power also provide more detailed coordinates for mapping stereotype contents to social structure than group status and inclusion do. But our approach does not suggest that stereotypes are self-fulfilling prophecies or reflect a kernel of truth. Stereotypes need not accurately represent power distributions to legitimate them. Hypothetically, any of the methods of stereotype legitimization we proposed could work in any power domain. However, our review showed that matching was especially apparent for knowledge and obligations, deservingness for legitimacy, resource control, and sexuality, beneficence for force and general power, and disguise for sexuality, obligations, and general power. New studies should investigate whether this patterns holds up with more systematic research on stereotype contents in these power domains and the processes that produce it.

Other lines of research are also necessary because stereotype contents are not the same as stereotyping in discourse (e.g., van Dijk, 1993). Our review invites new research examining stereotyping as communication with a political agenda. Considerable mass media analysis and discourse analysis provides the researchers’ opinions about how stereotypes work as rhetoric. The success of experiments on interpersonal communication goals in how people stereotype individuals (e.g., Clark & Kashima, 2007; Wenneker, Wigboldus, & Spears, 2005) portends that experiments can be used to test what political goals motivate people to use stereotypes to induce matching, sense of deservingness, senses of beneficence, or disguise group power. To complement such studies, the actual effectiveness at power legitimization of the methods we
proposed here should be tested. Together, such research can show more definitively how stereotypes can be used flexibly to legitimize power inequality and to change power relations.

**Short Biographies**

Felicia Pratto is a professor of psychology at the University of Connecticut. She completed her PhD from NYU in 1988, was an assistant professor at Stanford University from 1990 to 1997, whereupon she joined the faculty at the University of Connecticut as an Associate Professor. Her research concerns social cognitive processes that contribute to group biases, intergroup relations, particularly power and the structuring of sexism and ethnocentrism, and international violence. She is a fellow of the APA and APS.

Eileen V. Pitpitan is a student in the PhD program in social psychology at the University of Connecticut. Her research interests focus on power, gender, and sexuality, focusing especially on women’s sexual agency. She is studying how traditional gender norms regarding sexuality may affect women’s ability to maintain a positive and healthy lifestyle. She is also interested in processes related to overweight stigma and sexual violence. Ms. Pitpitan received her BA from UCLA and graduated summa cum laude. There, she worked and published with Dr. Neil Malamuth on risk for sexual aggression, pornography, and rape-supportive beliefs. Following completion of her PhD, Eileen plans to continue her research on power and gender. She also plans to continually advance her pedagogy skills as a feminist social psychologist who values education and the experimental study of social issues.

**Endnote**

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**References**


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